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That married male workers earn more than their unmarried co-workers is now 
well established in the labor economics literature. Traditional estimates of this marriage 
premium range from 10 to 40 percent. However, the source of this wage difference 
between married and unmarried men remains obscure. Some economists attribute this 
wage differential to differences in job productivity between married and single workers. 
Other economists attribute the wage differential to unobserved characteristics of married 
workers, i.e., selection effects. This thesis seeks to examine the possible causes of 
differences in job performance between married and single employers using data on Navy 
officers. 
The analysis shows that married male officers receive higher supervisor 
evaluation scores and promote at higher rates than single male officers. The results also 
show that there is a positive correlation between supervisor evaluations and promotion. 
The analysis of the effects of marital status shows that married officers achieved 
better performance than single officers. Unrestricted line (URL) male officers who have 
been married longer receive higher performance scores. For both URL and Staff / 
Restricted Line (STF/RL) male officers performance also increase as the number of 
dependents increase. OLS regression models also show that male officers who are 
married have attained more graduate education than single officers. 
The analysis of selection bias shows that single male officers who will marry in 
the future perform better than single officers who will remain single in the future. Fixed-
effects models that control unobservable individual characteristics support the higher 
performance of married males. Finally, Heckman style two-step models that control for 
selection bias due to retention decisions show that the measured effect of marriage is 
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A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
It is a fairly well established fact that married male workers earn more than single 
male co-workers in the civilian sector. Traditional estimates of this marriage premium 
range from 10 to 40 percent. However, the source of this wage difference between 
married men and single men remains debatable. Some economists attribute this wage 
differential to the increased productivity of married workers created by specialization 
between husbands and wives. Others attribute this wage differential to the selective 
characteristics of married workers. As regards the military sector, only one study 
(Anderson and Krieg, 2000) has previously examined the effects of marital status and 
family size on job performance.  
This thesis will utilize data on U.S. Navy officers to analyze the effect of marital 
status on job performance.  The thesis seeks to determine whether a marriage premium 
exists among U.S. Navy officers with respect to their marital status and family size, the 
degree to which the magnitude of the marriage premium differs between single and 
married officers and among officers with different numbers of dependents, and, more 
importantly, the reasons for the differentials. 
B. THESIS PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is first to find if marriage and family size affect the 
productivity of U.S. Navy officers. The second goal is to obtain an unbiased estimate of 
the effects of marriage on officer productivity by controlling for selectivity associated 
with the characteristics of officers who marry versus those who are single. 
C. THESIS SCOPE 
The scope of this research has six parts: (1) reviewing previous studies; (2) 
analyzing basic characteristics of data; (3) addressing main issues with methodologies; 
(4) estimating models and testing hypotheses; (5) summarizing major findings and 
recommendations; and (6) discussing limitations of the study and possible extensions. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions addressed by this thesis are: 
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1. Does marital status and number of dependents affect the productivity of 
civilian workers? 
2. Do married and single officers in the U.S. Navy have significantly 
different demographic characteristics? 
3. What indicators are available to analyze the productivity of U.S. Navy 
officers? 
4. Does marital status and number of dependents affect the productivity of 
U.S. Navy officers? 
5. For U.S. Navy officers, how does the effect of marriage on productivity 
differ in accordance with the accumulated years of marriage and the 
number of dependents? 
6. Can selection bias be eliminated in explaining the marriage premium for 
the U.S. Navy officer population? 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of the following chapters: 
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION. Introduces the problem, purpose, and scope of 
thesis and presents the research questions and the organization of this thesis. 
Chapter II: BACKGROUND. Summarizes the major hypotheses about the cause 
of marriage premium and findings on the existence and size of the premiums. 
Chapter III: LITERATURE REVIEW.  Discusses the mostly civilian studies on 
the marriage premium, the data sets used, model specifications and the major findings. 
Chapter IV: DATA.  Describes the personnel system of U.S. Navy officers 
(officer promotion, up-or-out policy, and promotion tournament system), officers’ family 
life, the basic characteristics of the data, and proxies available to measure officer’s on-
the-job productivity. 
Chapter V: METHODOLOGY. Discusses methodologies to estimate the 
multivariate models. 
Chapter V: MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS. Describes the main 
specification issues and development of each model and interprets the results of models. 
Chapter VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Summarizes the 
major findings from the study, recognizes limitations of the thesis, and provides 




Labor economists have conducted numerous studies to analyze the determinants 
of productivity. Since it is difficult to find direct data on the productivity of an employee, 
economists have used proxies to measure an employee’s on-the-job productivity. Under 
the assumption that the labor market is competitive, firms will base the pay of workers on 
the value of their marginal productivity (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000). Thus, wages and 
earnings can be used as proxies for productivity. In addition, data on wages is more 
readily available than data on actual worker productivity. When available, performance 
ratings and promotion variables have been used as indicators of productivity. In previous 
studies using wages and earnings as proxies for productivity, economists analyzed the 
effects of formal education, firm specific training, marital status, age, ethnic background, 
gender, and other demographic characteristics. 
That civilian married male workers earn more than their unmarried co-workers is 
now well established in the literature. Traditional estimates of this marriage premium 
range from 10 to 40 percent. However, the source of this wage difference between 
married men and unmarried men remains debatable. Some economists attribute this wage 
differential to the differences in job productivity of married workers and single workers. 
Other economists attribute the wage differential to unobserved characteristics of married 
workers, i.e., selection effects. 
B. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE MARRIAGE PREMIUM 
Several studies have analyzed the effects of marital status of civilian workers on 
their productivity, or more precisely, on their wages. Most of these studies have found 
that the wages of married males are significantly higher than otherwise equivalent single 
workers.  
The studies differ from each other in their explanations of the probable reasons 
for the higher wages of married males. There are two major explanations for the marriage 
premium. One is that the higher earnings of married men are associated with higher 
productivity, which is associated with being married. This hypothesis claims that 
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marriage directly increases the worker’s productivity on the job. The second major 
hypothesis contradicts the positive association between marital status and on-the-job 
productivity. Researchers supporting the second hypothesis attribute the higher marital 
wage/earnings differentials to selection bias, employer favoritism of married workers, or 
other explanations. 
1. Marriage Makes Men More Productive 
One of the first studies to claim that marriage increases the productivity of 
married men was by Hill (1979). She shows that married male workers earned 25-50 
percent higher wages than single male workers. When she added numerous controls for 
worker qualifications in her regression model, the positive earnings differential remained. 
Based on this finding, she claims the higher earnings of married men are not caused by 
unobservable individual characteristics, but rather are the result of increased productivity 
due to marriage. 
Korenman and Neumark (1991) conclude that marriage increases on-the–job 
productivity of men working in the labor market based on two important findings in their 
study. First, they found that wages were significantly higher for married men even:  
after controlling for selectivity into marriage based on fixed 
unobservables. Over eighty percent of the estimated impact of marriage on 
earnings survived the fixed-effects estimation. Moreover, large marriage 
premiums persisted even after adding controls to wage equations that 
should capture differences across marital status in the labor supply or in 
the investment in human capital. (p. 296) 
Their second finding was that the marriage premium continues to increase with 
each additional year of marriage. They claim that if the marriage premium resulted from 
the selection of men with unobservable individual characteristics, then we would not 
expect the marriage wage premium to rise based on the number of years married. 
Chun and Lee (2001) find that married men earn 12.4 percent more than men who 
never married after controlling for education, work experience, ethnic background, and 
factors that may affect both wages and marriage prospects. They also find that after 
controlling for selection, the unobservable attributes that might be associated with 
earning capabilities, married men still earn higher wages than men who never married. 
They claim that unmeasured earning capabilities are not correlated with unobservable 
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characteristics of individuals that are valued in the marriage process. They attribute the 
marriage premium to a worker’s increased productivity. 
However, the question remains as to what factors cause the increased productivity 
of married men. Economists usually cite the following reasons for why marriage 
increases the productivity of married male workers. 
a. Married Workers Are Able to Specialize in Labor Market 
Activities 
One argument is that the marital wage premium is caused by household 
specialization. Becker (1973, 1981) showed that marriage is economically beneficial 
because it makes greater specialization possible. He suggests that married workers are 
able to specialize in labor market activities while their spouses specialize in household 
production. Marriage causes the high wage-earning spouse, usually the male, to spend 
more time working in the market, and the low wage-earning spouse, usually the wife, to 
spend more time in household work. Women experience lower labor force participation 
rates due to the responsibility of bearing and raising children. Women consequently have 
less incentive to devote as much time and energy to work as men.  
Chun and Lee (2001) report that the marriage differential between married 
and never-married men decreases as wives put in more work hours outside the home. 
While married men whose wives are not working in the labor market earn 31.4 percent 
more per hour than men who never married, men whose wives are working 40 hours a 
week in the labor market earn only 3.4 percent more. Based on these findings, they claim 
that the marriage premium is explained by specialization within the household. 
On the other hand, two studies present evidence against the argument that 
marriage enables married men to specialize in market work. Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) 
estimate the effects of the wife’s labor market hours on the husband’s earnings with three 
different models. OLS estimates show that men whose wives do not work in the labor 
market earn 15 percent more than those whose wives work in the labor market. However, 
they do not rely on the OLS estimates since this model ignores the endogeneity problem. 
They estimate the effects of the wife’s labor market hours with both ‘two-stage’ and 
‘fixed effects’ models. The results from these two models reveal no significant difference 
in earnings between husbands whose wives work in the labor market and those whose 
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wives do not. Based on these findings, they conclude that the reason for the marriage 
premium is not the greater productivity of men due to household specialization. 
Hersch and Stratton (2000) also agree that the household specialization 
argument does not appear to explain the marriage premium. They claim that using the 
wives’ market hours is not a good indicator to measure household specialization. They 
claim that working wives in the labor market may affect the time the husband spends on 
household work in the opposite direction.  
Married men with employed wives may spend less time on housework 
than men whose wives are not employed because household income is 
greater, or they may spend more time because the value of their spouse’s 
time may be greater. The net effect will depend on the magnitude of these 
two components. (p. 80) 
Due to the weakness of using wives’ market hours to test the household 
specialization, they calculate the hours spent on housework by both married and single 
men. They find that married men spent the same amount of time on home production as 
single men. They conclude that the marriage premium does not seem to have resulted 
from greater household specialization. 
b. Married Men Make More Investments in Human Capital 
A second reason that has been advanced for the marriage wage differential 
is the greater investments in human capital made by married males. The additional 
investment in human capital is the reason for the higher wages or productivity. Kenny 
(1983), citing Becker (1973, 1981), suggests two explanations why married men 
accumulate human capital more rapidly when they are married than when they are not 
married. A married man can finance his training by borrowing from his wife’s earnings at 
rates lower than those available in outside capital markets. The other suggestion is that 
since married men anticipate spending a large fraction of their lifetime working because 
of family responsibilities, they are willing to invest more in human capital to reap the 
benefits for a longer period of time in the future. In this situation, the marginal cost of 
training is lower for married men.  
On the other hand, Cornwell and Rupert (1997), citing Bergstrom and 
Schoeni (1992), do not accept the argument that marriage makes it cheaper to accumulate 
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human capital. They base this conclusion on the finding that “individuals who acquire 
more formal education tend to marry later than those who acquire less.” (p. 285) 
2. Marriage Does Not Increase Productivity 
Loh (1996) claims that the conclusions of the previous studies explaining why 
married men earn more than unmarried men are not persuasive. In his study, Loh was 
able to contradict the two explanations for why marriage makes men more productive: (1) 
married men make greater investments in human capital; and (2) married men specialize 
in market work while the wife specializes in housework. First, he demonstrates that there 
is no difference in the marriage premium between two husbands depending on whether 
they have a working or non-working wife. This once again contradicts the hypothesis that 
married men with non-working wives have a greater opportunity to accumulate human 
capital. The second finding showed that the time spent by the man with his wife before 
marriage does not affect the marriage premium, which also contradicts the hypothesis 
that non-working wives specialize in household work while husbands specialize in 
market work. 
Cornwell and Rupert (1996), using the same data set used by Korenman and 
Neumark (1991), reach conclusions just the opposite of those of Korenman and Neumark 
(KN). Cornwell and Rupert (CR) find that the time spent in marriage has no significant 
effect on wages. CR suggest that this finding stands as evidence against the argument that 
marriage increases productivity. CR attribute the reasons why they find opposite results 
from KN (KN find the marriage premium and the time spent in marriage are positively 
correlated) to using a longer period when analyzing the marriage premium by calculating 
the “variation over time in the regressors.” CR track individuals for ten years from age 19 
to age 29, whereas KN track the same individuals from age 24 to 29. 
a. Marriage Premium is Due to Selection Bias 
The selection hypothesis argues that married workers receive more pay 
because they have different unobservable characteristics that are correlated both with 
their productivity and their marital status. Their higher wages are due to these 
characteristics, and even if they were not married, they would earn more than single 
workers. 
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Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) stress the importance of the potential 
correlation between the factors that influence both marital status and earnings but that 
remain unobserved by the researcher in causing biased estimates of the marital status 
variable. They try to eliminate the possibility that a process whose random unobservable 
component is correlated with unobservables in the wage function determines the marital 
status stochastically. They build a model in which “the individual’s marital status and 
subsequent earnings are determined in a manner that permits endogeneity among 
outcomes.” (p. 250) They conclude that when the model is estimated in a manner that 
addresses the potential for endogenous selection, marital status fails to emerge as a source 
of enhanced earnings. 
Cornwell and Rupert (1996) show that single men who will marry in the 
future earn more than single men who will not marry in the future. The first group earns 
at least as much as those who are already married. They claim that this finding shows that 
married men have characteristics valued in both the marriage and labor markets such as 
ability, honesty, loyalty, dependability and determination. 
Ginther and Zavodny (1998) test the argument that the apparent marriage 
premium is due to selection bias by measuring the effect of ‘shotgun’ weddings on 
marriage. They claim that by using this “natural experiment” they can estimate the effects 
of marital status in a way that is not correlated with the earning ability for some men. 
Their assumptions are that the likelihood of a premarital conception and likelihood that 
the couple marries is random. These outcomes may not be correlated with unobservable, 
potentially more ‘qualified’ characteristics of men who will marry. They estimate cross-
sectional and fixed effects regressions for the two types of married men. The apparent 
marriage premium calculated from cross-section regressions disappears when the 
marriage premium is calculated in fixed effects regressions for both types of married 
men. Thus, they show that the marriage premium is due to selection bias.  
The fixed-effect and cross-sectional regressions show a lower marriage 
premium for married men with a premarital conception. This means that a higher 
marriage premium for married men without a premarital conception is due to selection 
into marriage because of their higher wage earning characteristics. If the marriage 
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premium were due to increased productivity, this difference in productivity would have 
been seen in both types of marriages. 
b. Employers Pay More to Married Men because of a Signaling 
Mechanism 
Another hypothesis is that the wage difference between married and 
unmarried men is due to employers’ preferences for married workers over single workers 
due to employers’ perceptions that married workers are more responsible or stable. 
Perhaps marriage signals the ability to assume greater responsibilities. Thus, married 
workers are paid more. Another potential explanation for why supervisors favor married 
workers is that supervisors are usually older and more likely to be married. If so, married 
supervisors may understand the increased responsibilities of their married subordinates 
and support them with better pay. 
Hill (1979) suggests that the higher earnings of married men may be a 
result of employer discrimination in favor of married workers. She says the marriage 
premium may arise because “employers’ wage decisions are in part based on paternalistic 
attitudes which lead them to feel that workers with greater financial responsibilities to 
their families deserve higher wages.” (p. 592) She also suggests that workers with greater 
financial responsibilities may also be more adamant in pushing employers for higher 
wages. 
Loh (1996) tried to determine whether the marriage premium is caused by 
employer favoritism. He claims that if there is no effect of employer favoritism on the 
earnings of married men then the positive marriage premium must be observed for both 
self-employed and salaried workers. If married men are more productive than unmarried 
men, then their greater productivity and their higher earnings should be observed no 
matter where or how they earn a living. Loh finds that married self-employed men earn 
less than single self-employed men. This supports the argument that the marriage 
premium is not due to increased productivity, but occurs because of employer favoritism. 
Pfeffer and Ross (1982) suggest two other factors that can cause 
employers to favor married males. First, married men are rewarded because they conform 
to social expectations that men should be married and support their families, while 
unmarried men and married working women are penalized because of differing social 
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“norms.” Second, wives may build better social relations that improve the husbands’ 
standing with supervisors. The latter situation may characterize the military, especially 
the officers corps. 
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) do not accept the argument that the cause of 
the marriage premium is employer discrimination based on marital status. Their OLS 
estimates show that self-employed workers, a group that is not subject to the 
discriminatory behavior of supervisors, earn less when their wives work in the labor 
market than when their wives do not. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Almost all prior research on marital status shows that married man earn higher 
wages than unmarried men even after controlling education, work experience, race, age, 
occupation and similar characteristics. The wage difference caused by marital status is 
both statistically and economically significant. The previous studies claim that the wage 
differential between comparable married man and men who never married ranges 
between 10 and 40 percent. This chapter reviews and critiques eight previous studies. 
A. HILL 
Among the existing studies analyzing the marriage premium, the first widely cited 
study was conducted by Hill (1979). She uses cross-sectional data from the 1976 Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The sample consists of 5,212 household heads and 
wives ages 18-64 who worked at least 500 hours in 1975. She estimates 22-31 percent 
higher wages for married men than men who never married. She also estimates higher 
coefficients for widowed, divorced, or separated men. Married women on the average 
worked considerably less compared to married man in the sample she used. She also 
shows that married women are less stable workers than single women. Hill finds no 
evidence of a significant wage effect of marriage among women. 
In her regression model, Hill tries to determine whether marital status is one of 
the worker characteristics that increases productivity or whether it is just a variable that 
captures some other unobservable characteristics that are correlated with productivity. In 
her regression equation, she controls for numerous productivity-related aspects of 
workers’ qualifications in terms of labor force attachment, work history and on-the-job 
training. She included control variables such as work experience, job tenure, firm-
provided training, health status, occupation, industry, annual work hours, and number of 
children in four successive regression equations. As she adds more variables that are 
correlated with productivity in the regression models, the effects of marital status on 
wages remain remarkably stable. Thus, her findings provide evidence against the claim 
that the marriage premium reflects the unobserved productivity difference that favors 
married men. The findings contradict the selection hypothesis which argues that the 
marriage premium is due to the selection of ‘high qualified’ workers in marriage.  
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Hill’s results also show that workers with greater familial responsibilities, such as 
being married with a large number of children, receive higher wages than workers with 
fewer responsibilities. She says that the higher wages for more responsible married males 
could be productivity related, or they may be willing to work harder. Alternatively, 
married males may simply take unpleasant jobs in order to earn more money and the 
marital premium reflects this compensating wage differential. She makes some other 
assumptions about the wage differential based on marital status. She says that if the wage 
differential does not reflect an increase in productivity, it may either be that employers 
favor married workers or that married workers are more adamant about demanding higher 
wages from employers. 
Using cross-sectional data is one major weakness of Hill’s study. Without using 
longitudinal data it is impossible to control for unobservable individual fixed effects. 
Later studies were able to exploit longitudinal data. 
B. KENNY 
Kenny (1983) uses retrospective data from the Coleman-Rossi Retrospective Life 
Histories Study, which is a survey of 1589 men, ranging in age from 30 to 40. The 
respondents were questioned about the history of their employment, marital status, 
educational attainment, and other characteristics in 1969. The average length of marriage 
in the sample is 10 years. He finds that married males receive 17 to 20 percent higher 
wages than single males even when differences in educational attainment, experience, 
and race are controlled. He also finds that wages increase more for a man while married 
than while not married. He attributes this wage differential to additional investment in 
human capital that occurs during marriage.  
He makes several arguments about why married men may invest more in human 
capital than single men. First, he cites Becker’s (1973, 1981) specialization hypothesis; 
“marriage makes it worthwhile for the high wage spouse (e.g., the male) to spend more 
hours earning money and for the low wage spouse (e.g., the female) to spend additional 
time in household production” (p. 224). His other explanation for why married men make 
bigger investments in training is that since married males anticipate working longer 
during their lives, they have more time to reap the benefits of greater training. As a result, 
the marginal cost of hourly investment in human capital is cheaper for married men. 
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In the remaining part of his study, Kenny mainly tries to determine whether a 
male accumulates human capital more rapidly while married than while single. He uses 
an equation to calculate the difference between the growth rate in wages when married 
and the growth rate in wages when single as a function of investment in human capital: 
(ln Wv+1-lnWv) – (ln Ws+1-lnWs) = mv – b(v-s) + [(lnαv+1− lnαv)−(lnαs+1− lnαs)]  
The left side of the equation shows changes in the log of the wage per month 
during the time married and single, mv represents the speed of accumulation of human 
capital during the months married, v is the age when he marries, s is the age when he was 
single, (lnαv+1− lnαv)  is the unit of human capital change during the months married, and 
(lnαs+1− lnαs) is the unit of human capital change during the months single. Based on 
estimates of this equation, the results show that the value of mv is .00154 and significant 
at .10. Kenny claims that this result shows that human capital is accumulated more 
rapidly when a male is married than when that same male is single, all other things being 
equal. 
Finally, Kenny formulates an equation to examine the hypothesis that a married 
man makes more investments in human capital since investing is cheaper for him 
compared to a single man. The logic behind this theory is that a married man is able to 
borrow at a lower cost from a wife than from other sources to finance his investment in 
human capital. After the results, he concludes that the level of additional investment in 
human capital during marriage by a man is positively correlated with the time that he 
spends in the labor force while married. 
The weakness of Kenny’s study is that he does not provide concrete evidence to 
support his claims. As Korenman and Neumark (1991) point out, the observed wage 
differentials could be caused by employer favoritism as well as by increased investment 
in human capital. 
C. NAKOSTEEN AND ZIMMER 
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) cite the two main explanations for the marriage 
premium. The first one is that marriage creates incentives for men to specialize in market 
work, and the second one is that during marriage men make more investments in human 
capital. However, they claim that there is a possibility of correlation between factors that 
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influence both marital status and earnings but remain unobserved, and thus cause biased 
estimates of the marriage premium.  
They use data extracted from the Michigan Panel Survey of Income Dynamics 
based on a sample of 576 male workers. The sample they use consists of very young men 
between the ages of 18 and 24. They try to deal with the selection problem that causes 
biased estimates of marriage due to unobservable characteristics of married workers that 
are correlated with higher wages. They describe the problem as follows: 
A possibility exists that marital status is determined stochastically by a process 
whose random unobservable component is correlated with unobservables in the 
wage/earnings function. In such a case, conventional least squares estimates of the wage 
function, in particular the marital status coefficient and its standard error, are biased and 
inconsistent (p. 250).  
Nakosteen and Zimmer claim that endogeneity arises in conventional least 
squares estimations because each individual self-selects into a chosen status in 
accordance with some stochastic sorting mechanism. Moreover, endogenous sorting 
manifests itself in a manner that cannot be causally observed. To deal with this problem, 
they use two-stage models in which endogeneity between marital status and earnings are 
allowed. In the first equation, they use marital status as a function of explanatory 
variables along with a random disturbance term representing unobservable factors in the 
determination of marital status. In this marital status equation they include the log of 
earnings, which is inserted from the second equation, a set of predetermined family 
background variables such as each parent’s educational attainment, number of siblings, 
and a dummy indicator for each and the presence of older siblings, religion, race, and 
urban upbringing.  
In the second equation, they specify the logarithm of annual earnings as a linear 
function of human capital and other control variables and a random disturbance term. In 
their earnings equation they included schooling, experience, a quadratic experience term, 
and a dummy variable for veteran status and for race. The reason for building this two-
stage model is to include marital status in a separate equation, and thus allow the outcome 
to alter the structure of the earnings equation. The results of the second equation show 
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that marital status fails to emerge as a source of enhanced earnings when the model is 
estimated in a manner that addresses the potential for endogenous selection. They 
conclude that the effect of marriage on wages disappears when the model is estimated 
free of selection bias. 
Since their sample consists of very young men, they recommend trying to 
replicate their findings with observations on older men. They also recommend extending 
the reasoning to other determinants of earnings such as the role of health, language 
characteristics, and religious affiliation.  
D. KORENMAN AND NEUMARK 
Korenman and Neumark (1991) try to determine whether marriage really makes 
men more productive. In the first part of their study, they use data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. The sample consists of men from 14 to 24 in 1966, 
and each individual is followed for 15 years. The sample is restricted to white men who 
completed school by 1976. The sample size is 1,541. The sample statistics show that non-
wage characteristics differ according to a man’s marital status. Married men in the 
sample are older and they have more work experience than single men. On the other 
hand, single men have completed more years of schooling but on average they work less 
than married men. 
To eliminate the effects of unobservable, individual-specific factors that correlate 
with high wages and cause a bias in the marriage dummy coefficient, they estimated a 
model aimed to remove the individual fixed effects. They define the true model as: 
Ln(Wit)=αXit + γ MSTit + Ai + εit 
where Wit is the wage of individual i in year t, Xit is observable characteristics of 
individual i in year t, Ai is unobservable characteristics of individual i, and MSTit is 
marital status dummy variable of individual i in year t. The selection bias hypothesis 
claims that there is a positive correlation between MSTit and Ai causing an upwardly 
biased estimate of γ when the model is estimated by least squares. Korenman and 
Neumark (KN) use the following equation as a solution to this problem. 
Ln(Wit) - Ln(Wi’) =α(Xit - Xi’) + γ (MSTit - MSTi’) + νit 
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where, for any variable Z, the mean of Z for individual i across the years t of the survey is 
denoted Zi’. 
After controlling for these individual-specific characteristics, their model still 
showed that a significant marriage premium exists. They conclude that less than 20% of 
the marriage premium is associated with fixed unobservable characteristics of individuals 
that are positively correlated with both marriage and wages, and that the remainder of the 
marriage wage premium is due to productivity-enhancing effects of marriage. 
However, the previous problem that existed in Kenny’s (1983) study holds true 
for their conclusion: They cannot rule out other explanations such as employer 
favoritism. They rule out the selection bias hypothesis by showing that the marriage 
premium continues to grow as the number of years a man is married increases. If the 
higher wages of married men were due to the selection of men with higher wages in a 
marriage, then the higher wages of married men would not increase systematically as the 
years they have been married increase. This indicates that other factors still affect the 
wages of married men rather than just selection into marriage. 
In the second part of their paper, KN analyze the marriage premium by using 
company-level data from a large U.S. manufacturing firm. The data are described in 
detail in Medoff and Abraham (1981). The data consists of 8,235 white male managers 
and professionals (serving in very homogeneous occupations) working within a single 
firm in 1976. The benefit of using this data file is that it automatically controls for 
important characteristics of workers and jobs that vary widely across individuals in 
national data sets where workers are employed in many different firms. The other benefit 
of this company-level data is they contain supervisor performance ratings, which provide 
a second measure of worker performance. Each worker’s performance in the firm is rated 
on a six-point scale annually by his immediate supervisor. Additionally, each worker is 
ranked relative to other workers doing similar jobs. One other performance measure that 
is used by KN is the employee’s job grade. The company assigns workers to job grades 
according to their relative value to the company. Thus, the wages of workers in any given 
job grade are is very close to each other. 
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Simple statistics show that married workers earn annually 25 percent more than 
single workers ($26,873 to $21,384 in 1976). KN also show that married workers occupy 
higher job grades in higher proportions than single workers do. 37 percent of the workers 
are in the ‘highest two job quartiles’ group. 38 percent of this group is married, while 17 
percent is single. KN estimate the marriage premium for this company’s workers by 
using OLS techniques controlling for pre-company experience and its square, company 
service and its square, and dummy variables for region and education. The results show 
that married workers earn 12 percent more annually than single workers do. When they 
control for job grade in this equation, the marriage premium decreases to only 2.5 
percent, since wages of all workers in any given grade are very close to each other. 
Then, KN try to determine whether the higher grades of married men are due to 
married workers’ older age and their greater job experience (married workers in the 
company have 11.5 years more company service than single workers), or the result of 
increased productivity due to marriage. To determine the answer they estimate the 
promotion probabilities of workers based on their marital status with multinomial logit 
models. In these models they use a sample of “recent hires” (280 workers with two or 
fewer years of company service) controlling for pre-company experience and its square, 
company service and its square, and dummy variables for region, education, and job 
grade. The results show that married male workers are more likely to receive higher 
performance ratings than single male workers and, consequently, that the probability of 
promotion for married male workers is higher (10.5 percent) than that of single male 
workers. 
KN conclude that since married male workers are more productive and that they 
receive higher performance ratings from their supervisors. The higher ratings cause them 
to be promoted faster. As a result, the higher job grades enable them to earn more than 
single male workers. 
E. LOH 
Loh (1996) uses data from the 1990 survey of the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth Labor Market Experience (NLSY). The sample consisted of 2,626 young men 
and women between 14 and 22 years of age when they were first interviewed in 1979. 
Loh, in his paper, claims that previous studies that attribute the marriage premium to 
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increased productivity are all inconclusive because their findings do not rule out the 
alternative explanations of, for instance, the probability that employers discriminate in 
favor of married men.  
At first, he reports OLS benchmark estimates of wage differences associated with 
being married, divorced or separated. He shows that married men earn 9.1 percent more 
in hourly wages than single men holding education, tenure, unemployment rate, region, 
and other variables constant. He says that this marriage premium does not change 
significantly when adding controls for total hours worked, and the presence of children 
less than six years old. The marriage premium of 9.1 percent is similar to the cross-
sectional estimate of 11 percent in Korenman and Neumark (1991), who use similar data 
from NLS young men data. These marriage premium estimates are smaller than those 
reported elsewhere. For example, Hill (1979) reports estimates between 22 percent and 
31 percent for PSID males. One reason for finding different marriage premiums may be 
the choice of the wage rates used in the models. Loh, and Korenman and Neumark use 
hourly wages as the dependent variables whereas Hill uses the ratio of annual earnings to 
annual hours worked. 
In his study, Loh tests two popular marriage premium theories. The first 
hypothesis tested by Loh is Becker’s (1973, 1981) theory suggesting that married male 
workers specialize in labor market work while their wives specialize in household 
production. From this theory, he concludes 
if work hours in the market and in the home are substitutes, women with 
more market work hours must be relatively less specialized to home 
production than women with fewer market work hours. As a result, the 
Becker model predicts smaller human capital investment by men in the 
former households. They should correspondingly receive a lower marriage 
wage premium as well. (p. 578)  
To test this theory, he accumulates the total number of weeks worked by the wife 
over the duration of the marriage up to 1989 and then divides this total into six lengths 
represented by six dummy variables (0 years, <2 years, 2-4 years, 4-6 years, 6-8 years, >8 
years), which are included in his regression model. His results show that in contrast to the 
prediction of the specialization theory, married men with wives who devote more time to 
the labor market receive a higher marriage premium than those whose wives do not work 
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at all, holding marriage length and other variables constant. This finding thus contradicts 
the hypothesis that married men with non-working wives have greater opportunities to 
accumulate human capital.  
Loh was also able to reject the specialization theory by looking at the problem 
from another view of point. He claims that if this theory is true, then currently married 
men who cohabitated with their present wife before marriage should receive a higher 
marriage premium, all else being constant. He gives two reasons for this. First, even if no 
division of labor or specialization occurred during cohabitation, the information gathered 
by the partners about each other provides them with a head start on the specialization 
process when they get married. Second, if greater specialization occurred during 
cohabitation and increased investments in human capital were made, then married men 
who cohabited with their wives before marriage must receive a higher marriage premium 
compared to the ones who did not cohabitate. To test this theory he adds two dummy 
variables measuring living arrangements of sample individuals in the model. The first 
variable indicates those currently married men who lived with their wives before they 
were married. The second variable indicates those presently not married but who are 
living with a woman as a partner. The results show that men in both groups receive the 
same marriage premium as married men who did not live with their wives before 
marriage. He claims that these findings contradict the specialization theory. 
Secondly, Loh tests the theory that employers favor married men as workers 
though there are no actual productivity differences. He reasons that if this theory is not 
true, then the positive marriage premium should be observed for both married self-
employed and salaried workers. Also, if marriage really makes men more productive, 
then a positive marriage premium should be observed for both self-employed and salaried 
married men. If not, then the source of the marriage premium is employer favoritism. He 
builds a model including a self-employed dummy and an interaction between the self-
employed and married dummy. He finds that self-employed men who are married earn 
11.89 percent less than self-employed men who are single. This shows evidence that 
marriage premium is not due to increased productivity, but could be due to employer 
favoritism.  
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Loh also shows that there is a positive relationship between the education level of 
the wife and the husband’s marriage premium. This finding supports the suggestion made 
by Pfeffer and Ross (1982) that wives may build better social relations that improve the 
husbands’ standing with supervisors. 
F. GRAY 
Gray (1997) conducted a very extensive study of the marriage premium and 
reviewed all the previous studies and hypotheses discussed above. He uses two different 
data sets for his study. One is the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), and the other is 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). He estimates models using both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal data for two different time periods. The first period is 
1976-1980, and the second period is 1989-1993. He analyzes the marriage wage 
differential for white young men aged 24 to 31. The dependent variable of the models is 
hourly wages. 
Gray presents summary statistics for each sample. The summary statistics reveal 
that the characteristics of the sample are similar to the samples used by other researchers. 
Married men have higher hourly wages, are older, have less accumulated education, and 
have more years of work experience than men who never married. His summary statistics 
also makes it possible to compare the change in the effects of marriage from 1976 to 
1989. The table shows that besides a decrease in real wages irrespective of marital status, 
the wage difference associated with marriage also decreased. In 1976, the average hourly 
wage of men who never married was 13 percent lower than the average hourly wage of 
married men. By 1989, the hourly wage differential between married and men who never 
married had decreased to 9 percent. During the period this fall in the marriage wage 
premium was occurring the mean labor market hours worked by wives increased from 
14.6 hours per week in 1976 to 28.3 hours per week in 1989, signaling a decline in 
specialization within households. 
Gray tests whether the marital status premium has been decreasing over time, and 
tries to find underlying reasons for such a decrease with both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal data. For cross-sectional wage equation estimates, he uses the pooled NLS 
and NLSY samples. He mentions the probable positive correlation between individual i’s 
time-invariant unobserved characteristics captured by the error term and the marital status 
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dummy. To address this unobservable variable bias in the longitudinal equation, he uses a 
within-group estimator that eliminates the latent error term and any potential correlations 
between the error term and the other independent variables. 
The results show that the decline in the marriage wage premium over time 
increases after controlling for individual characteristics. However, Gray does not explain 
which individual characteristics are controlled for in his equations. The cross-sectional 
equation results suggest that during the 1976-1980 period, the marital status wage 
difference is 11 percent more for married men than men who never married. However, 
during 1989-1993, this wage difference dropped to 6 percent. This is a 45 percent 
decrease between the two periods. The results from the longitudinal equation suggest that 
the marriage wage premium is 9 percent for the first period, but almost disappears for the 
second period. Since the longitudinal equation eliminates fixed individual characteristics, 
the author suggests that the decrease in the marriage premium resulting from this 
equation is evidence that wages and the probability of marriage are positively correlated 
with an individual’s fixed unobservable characteristics. 
The relationship between the marriage premium and marriage tenure also are 
analyzed in the paper. Gray cites two previous findings that suggest a positive 
relationship between the years married and the marriage premium. Kenny (1982) argues 
that the marriage premium increases as the number of years married increases. Korenman 
and Neumark (1991) find that the marriage premium is quadratic in the total number of 
years a man has been married. These findings suggest that marriage has productivity-
enhancing effects. Gray’s findings from the cross-sectional equation in which cross-
sectional wages increase by 2.4 percent per year during the first few years of marriage, 
support this hypothesis. However, Gray does not attribute this finding to a positive 
relationship between marital tenure and productivity. He says that this increase in marital 
wage premium dependent on marital tenure may also result from the probability that 
more years married may be correlated with men’s unobservable ability as well. 
He also analyzes the hypothesis that the marriage premium is due to specialization 
in marriage with the spouse working in the market place devoting more time to his job 
while the spouse specializes household production. If this hypothesis is true then the 
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marriage wage premium should be higher for those whose wives do not work or work 
less in the paid labor market. He finds evidence to support this hypothesis for the 1976-
1980 period. The cross-sectional equation results show 1.8 percentage points lower wage 
differential for each additional ten hours per week a wife worked in the labor market. The 
longitudinal estimates show that those men whose wives work in the labor market full-
time earn 5% less than those whose wives work in home production. However, 
interestingly for the 1989-1993 period, the results show a significant decrease for this 
wage differential depending on specialization within the marriage. For this second period, 
longitudinal estimates show that there is no wage difference between two married men 
due to the hours their wives work in the labor market. The explanation suggested by the 
author for these later findings is that “if the husbands are devoting more time and energy 
to home production activities independent of the time their wives spend in paid 
employment, then decreased specialization could explain the fall in the productivity-
enhancing effects of marriage.” (p. 498) 
Gray concludes that the marriage premium paid to young male workers decreased 
dramatically, or by more than 40 percent between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. The 
most apparent reason for this decline is less specialization taking place within marriages 
rather than any decrease in the return to specialization. 
G. ANDERSON AND KRIEG 
The only study we were able to find which analyzes the marriage premium in the 
U.S. military was done by Anderson and Krieg (2000), which analyzes the marriage 
premium for U.S. first-term enlisted Marines. They use a data set from a survey of 65,535 
Marines provided by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 
and Manpower Plans and Policy Division. Citing from Beindorf (1999), they show that 
married Marines have a 44.2 percent lower attrition rate, and a 58 percent lower all 
misconduct-related discharge rate than single Marine counterparts. They cite also that 
28.2 percent of married Marines reenlist while only 14.1 percent of single Marines 
reenlist. Married Marines are also on average one year older, have served in the military 
approximately four months longer, have slightly lower Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
(AFQT) and physical fitness test (PFT) scores, and generally are evaluated better by their 
supervisors. Married Marines have slightly higher ranks on average than single Marines. 
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They use two measures of performance in their analysis: the probability of 
promotion to the next grade, and supervisors’ evaluation scores. They use a probit model 
to calculate the probability of promotion to E-3 and E-4 during the first term. They find 
that the promotion probability of married Marines is higher than for single Marines. For 
example, married Marines without dependents have a 4.7 percent higher promotion 
probability to E-4 than single Marines. The model results show that married Marines 
without dependents have a higher promotion probability than married Marines with 
dependents. They suggest this finding is evidence that marriage premium is not due to 
supervisors’ favoritism for married workers. If supervisors are rewarding married 
workers just because they are married, their perception will not change whether their 
married workers have dependents or not. They interpret one result of this probit model 
differently from civilian labor market economists. Their model shows that divorced 
Marines still have a greater probability of being promoted than single Marines. They do 
not attribute this finding as contrary to the household specialization argument. They 
argue, however, that divorced Marines are different from workers who are divorced in the 
civilian labor market. First, divorced Marines receive a great amount of support from 
counseling services in the Marine Corps. Second, most of the divorced Marines live on 
military bases where they face less housework than divorced civilian workers. 
Anderson and Krieg use an ordinary least squares model to calculate the effect of 
marital status on supervisors’ performance evaluation scores. They use Marines’ 
proficiency (PRO) and conduct (CON) scores as dependent variables. Supervisors use 
PRO scores to evaluate technical skills, specialized knowledge, and traits like leadership, 
initiative, and dependability. CON scores are used to measure Marines’ military-specific 
qualifications such as military bearing, attitude, obedience, and integrity. The regression 
results show that married Marines receive higher evolution numbers in both PRO and 
CON scores than single Marines. 
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Anderson and Krieg test the relationship between the two performance indicators 
and find a positive relationship between them. The higher the evaluation scores a Marine 
receives from his supervisor, the more likely he will be promoted. They conclude that the 
cause of the marriage premium is supervisors’ evaluations that consistently rank married 
Marines higher than their single counterparts. They do not show a specific reason why 
supervisors rate married Marines higher. They say that the reason may either be higher 
productivity of married Marines, which is either increased by marriage, or that more 
productive Marines marry (selectivity). 
H. CHUN AND LEE 
Chun and Lee (2001) conducted one of the latest studies analyzing the reasons for 
why married men earn more. They use data drawn from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) March Supplement 1999. The data set they use captures the recent changes in the 
average age of marriage and household specialization issues. For example, the median 
age for the first marriage was 23.2 years in 1970 for men and increased to 26.7 years in 
1998, indicating an increase in delaying marriage in the late 1990’s. Moreover, female 
labor force participation in the 1990’s is higher than in the 1970’s. One other advantage 
of the data set they use is it consists of working males from 18 to 40 years of age. Most of 
the previous studies use a sample of younger men. Using a sample of older ages could 
capture the effects of marriage more clearly, since the older sample captures the effects of 
marrying at older ages. Another advantage of the data set is it contains detailed 
information about the wife’s working conditions in the market place and some other 
family characteristics. 
Summary statistics in Chun and Lee show that the average hourly wages of 
married men is 30 percent higher than that of men who never married. An unusual feature 
of their data is that married men have more formal education than men who never 
married. Previous studies using data from older periods find that married men have less 
formal schooling than men who never married. However, Chun and Lee show that 
married men in their sample who have at least some college education average 6 percent 
higher wages then men who never married having at least some college education. 
Chun and Lee first show evidence that the marriage premium cannot be attributed 
to the unobservable individual characteristics that cause the selection of certain types of 
males into marriage and an upward bias to the marriage dummy variable. Second, they 
show that the marriage premium is negatively correlated with the hours the wife works in 
the market place. They argue that this correlation suggests the argument that marriage 
causes married men to specialize in market work and makes them more productive. 
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In their first model, they use a switching regression equation with endogenous 
marriage selection. With this equation, which is different from previous studies, they deal 
not only with the problems caused by the correlation between marital status and wages, 
but also with biases caused by the marriage selection process, which are not necessarily 
related to the wages of married men (such as the wife’s working hours which is an index 
of marriage market conditions). Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) also used a two-stage 
equation to deal with this problem.  
Chun and Lee first predict a ‘marriage selection’ equation, which includes all 
variables that are correlated with wages and some variables that are not. They use a 
wife’s predicted working hours as a dependent variable for this equation. In this equation, 
they use two exogenous variables that are assumed to be correlated with marriage but 
uncorrelated with the husband’s wage equation. The first exogenous variable indicates 
whether the couple lives with relatives other than their children. The second exogenous 
variable is the proportion of female employment in the state. After predicting the wife’s 
working hours, they replace actual hours with predicted hours, and they estimate 
switching regression models with endogenous marriage selection. This model estimates a 
marriage coefficient of 0.120, which is higher than the coefficient they estimated with 
OLS techniques, 0.117, which did not control for the correlation between wages and 
marriage selection.  
This result is different from previous studies. In previous studies, controlling for 
endogeneity reduced the size of the coefficients on the marital status dummy. Based on 
their finding that unobservable marriage selection criteria are not positively correlated 
with unmeasurable individual characteristics that cause married men to be more 
productive, the authors conclude that there is no apparent marriage premium arising from 
the selection of potentially more successful workers into marriage. 
In their second model, Chun and Lee test the specialization argument, which is 
that marriage increases the productivity by allowing the husband to specialize in market 
work. They divide the marriage premium into two parts: the positive effect of marriage 
with the wife not working in the market place, and the marriage premium decrease based 
on every additional hour a wife works in the market place. They estimate that men whose 
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wives do not work in the labor market, and thus specialize in household work, earn 
31.4% more than men who never married. They also estimate that the marriage premium 
decreases by 0.6% for each additional hour the wife works outside the home. They 
compare the earnings of men whose wives are not employed and whose wives have a full 
time job with the earnings of never-married men. Men whose wives are not employed 
earn 31% more than men who never married, and the men whose wives have a full-time 
job earn only 3.4% more than men who never married. They claim that these two 
findings support the positive relationship between the marriage premium and the degree 
of specialization of the wife in household work. 
I. SUMMARY 
Table III-1 summarizes previous research. The table presents the data sample and 
methodology used as well as results of each study. 
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 Table III-1. Summary of Previous Studies. 
 





OLS Married men earn 25-30% more even after numerous 
controls for worker qualifications. 
Married men with more children receive higher wages. 
Kenny (1983) Coleman-Rossi 
Retrospective Life 
Histories Study (1969) 
N=1,233 
OLS Married men receive 17-20% higher wages than single 
men after numerous controls. 
Men’s wage growth during their married months is 







The effect of marital status on wages disappears when 














Married men earn 15% higher hourly wages than men 
who never married. More than 80% of this differential 
survives after ‘fixed unobservables’ are added. 
Marriage premium continues to grow with each year 
men have been married. 
Married workers in single company have 10.5% more 
probability to promote than single workers. 
Loh (1996) National Longitudinal 






Married men with wives who work receive a higher 
marriage premium than those whose wives do not work. 
Self-employed married men earn 12% less then single 
self-employed men. 
Gray (1997) National Longitudinal 
Survey, and National 





The marriage premium to young male workers fell more 
than 40% between the late 1970’s and the early 1990’s. 
During the late 1970’s married men whose wives work 
full-time earn 5% less than those whose wives do not 
work. During the early 1990’s this difference disappears. 
Anderson and 
Krieg (2000) 
First term enlisted 
Marines survey provided 
by Headquarters U.S. 
Marine Corps  
N=44,103 
OLS Married Marines’ promotion probability is higher than 
unmarried Marines. (Married Marines without 
dependents promotion probability to E-4 is 4.7 percent 
higher than single Marines’ probability.) 
Married Marines receive higher performance evaluation 
scores than their single counterparts.(Married E-2 
Marines without dependents receive approximately .15 
points higher scores (scale is from 0 to 5) than single 
Marines.) 
Chun and Lee 
(2001) 
Current Population 




Married men earn 12.4% more per hour than men who 
never married. This difference does not drop after 
controlling for individual-specific earning characteristics 
that are valued in marriage market. 
Married men whose wives don’t work earn 31.4% more 
per hour than men who never married. This marriage 
premium decreases as the wives put in more hours 
working. For example, men whose wives have a full-
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IV. DATA 
A. DATA SOURCE 
The data for this study includes information about U.S. Navy officers who entered 
the Navy between 1976 and 1985. The data file is the same file used by Bowman and 
Mehay (1999) in their study “Graduate Education and Employee Performance: Evidence 
from Military Personnel.” They constructed the database by first incorporating data from 
the Navy Bureau of Personnel’s Promotion History File, which provides information on 
the promotion of officers to Lieutenant Commander (grade 4). This data was matched 
with files from the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center that contained 
information on officers’ fitness report prior to the grade 4 promotion review. The 
matched data file includes information on the marital status of each individual for three 
different periods in their lives:  upon joining the Navy, four years later at the O-3 
promotion board, and ten years later at the O-4 promotion board. The data make it 
possible to track changes in marital status and dependents over time, and to analyze the 
ensuing effects of these changes. The data file also contains the officer’s annual fitness 
reports, promotion history, and Navy job experiences.  
In addition to the main personnel data file, this thesis used additional data that 
characterized officers’ marital status and dependents upon entry to the Navy. The 
additional data were obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center and matched to 
each individual officer in the main data file. 
B. NAVY PERSONNEL SYSTEM 
The Navy personnel system is mainly characterized by an internal labor market 
with a vertical hierarchy, no lateral entry, administrative pay setting, and up-or-out 
promotion (Bowman and Mehay, 1999). The internal labor market consists of clusters of 
jobs linked to each other by the skills and capacities required. The military is also 
characterized by promotion tournaments, which are often used within the context of 
internal labor markets to motivate workers (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000). 
1. Navy Officer Promotions 
The Navy’s officer corps is structured like a pyramid. The wide personnel base 
consists of junior officers and the pyramid shrinks with each successive upward 
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movement through the rank structure. Personnel inventory decreases severely near the 
peak at the flag officer level and the Chief of Naval Operations occupies the top position. 
The Navy’s promotion system is vacancy driven. The Defense Officer Personnel 
Management Act (DOPMA) constrains the number of officers in the grades of O-4 to O-6 
that each service might retain as a percentage of its officer corps (RAND, 1994). 
Promotion plans are developed annually to determine the projected need for officers in 
each grade and designator. 
Selection opportunity has three components: authorized officer strength, 
promotion flow point and selection opportunity (percentage). Authorized officer strength 
is the total number of officers authorized that will serve in the Navy for each year. 
Promotion flow point is the average number of years of service commissioned officers 
must have to be promoted to the next higher grade. Selection opportunity is the ratio of 
the number of higher-grade vacancies to the number of lower-grade billets. Along with 
these higher-grade vacancies, the selection percentage guidelines are used to determine 
who is “in zone” for selection in the lower-grade. For example, if planners calculate the 
need for 500 lieutenant commanders in the unrestricted line (URL), and 50 percent is 
desired for the selection opportunity, then the zone must include 1000 URL lieutenants. 
Table IV.1 shows promotion flow points and selection percentages for Navy officers. 
(The Navy Media Center, 1997) 
 
Table IV.1. Promotion Flow Points. 
 
To Grade of Promotion Flow Point Selection Percentages 
LTJG 2 Years 100% (if fully qualified) 
LT 4 Years 95-100% 
LCDR 9 to 11 Years 70 to 90% 
CDR 15 to 17 Years 60 to 80% 
CAPT 21 to 23 Years 40 to 60% 
From:  The Navy Media Center, All Hands, August, 1997, pp. 89-90. 
 
Promotion boards for each competitive category select officers for promotion. 
Selection boards are composed of officers who have shown outstanding quality of 
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performance, maturity, judgment, naval background and experience. Each member takes 
an oath to consider all eligible officers without partiality and to recommend for 
promotion only those officers who are “best qualified.” (The Navy Media Center, 1997) 
2. Up-or-Out Systems 
Up-or-out promotion structures are commonly used in universities, professional 
service firms, and the military. In an up-or-out system, employees are evaluated after 
observing their performance for a period of time. Workers who perform above a certain 
performance criteria are promoted while those failing to make the grade are dismissed 
from the organization. This system combines the benefit of a merit-based system that 
rewards ‘better’ performers and that drops poor performers from the candidate pool. 
(Phelan and Lin, 2000) 
The up-or-out structure is used in the Navy by commissioning officers into the 
Navy at the beginning of their careers and then forcing or inducing them to separate on 
some basis, such as failure to progress in grade, at a later point. This structure provides 
the Navy with continued good performance in the lower grades and retention of the best-
performing officer. However, forcing out officers who perform much more poorly later 
and substituting new officers disrupts organizations and causes a high turnover rate that 
increases training costs. Moreover, the military is the only organization in which the 
profession of being an officer can be practiced. A doctor can leave one hospital and start 
working at another hospital, but an officer cannot work as an officer if forced to leave the 
military. Forced separation terminates the ability of an officer to practice his or her 
profession. (Rand, 1994) 
3. Promotion Tournaments 
The Navy uses a kind of promotion tournament system to motivate officers. 
“Tournaments have three main features: who will win is uncertain, the winner is selected 
based on relative performance (that is, performance compared to that of the other 
“contestants”), and the rewards are concentrated in the hands of the winner, so there is a 
big difference between winning and losing.” In this system, only the winners get the prize 
at the end of their careers. Furthermore, once the winners are known, the losers might 
lose their motivation to work, while the winners may “rest on their laurels.” One other 
problem related to this system is that employees may not be willing to enter this 
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tournament because what they might lose, given that they did not win, comes at a very 
high price (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000). 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) compare the rank-ordered tournaments compensation 
system with the piece rate compensation system that is based on individual output and 
effort. They find that employees in tournament systems are at least motivated as much as 
in a piece rate system. They suggest that the large salaries of higher positions in the firms 
may provide incentives for all workers to work hard to increase their chance of winning 
one of the top positions. Furthermore, compensating workers on the basis of their relative 
performance in the firm provides a lower cost method of measuring and monitoring the 
relative positions of workers instead of measuring the level of each worker’s output 
directly. Another advantage of a rank-ordered tournaments system is that it eliminates 
income variation. Every worker receives the same earnings at the same rank. 
C. NAVY OFFICER’S FAMILY LIFE 
The family life of an officer is different in some aspects from the family life of a 
civilian worker. First of all, during the early stages of a naval officer’s career, typically 
from Ensign to Lieutenant Junior Grade, the young careerist must construct his own 
identity through work and adapt to the demands of the Navy. Junior officers have to do a 
lot of “dirty work” in the unit and must dedicate most of their time to the Navy. On the 
other hand, during this time the Navy tries to determine whether the new officers are 
suited for future missions. 
Moreover, if naval officers are married during this time, they must develop a 
work-family life with their spouses. Building this new life may be more difficult than it 
was for their parents or in civilian careers. The difficulty is not only the longer hours the 
officers must work, but also the frequency at which they leave home for extended tours at 
sea. Since this early career period is the worst in terms of hardships, young married 
officers concentrate most of their time on their jobs instead of their spouses. The problem 
during this period is to convert the spouse to the Navy way of life, especially when the 
spouse is completely unacquainted with such a lifestyle  
The policy of frequent moves also causes two big problems for an officer's family. 
One problem arises concerning the spouse’s job. It is difficult for spouses to find stable 
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jobs when moving so frequently. The other problem arises when the officer's children 
reach school age and frequent moves require children to change schools. 
At this early career stage several types of officers overcome the problems 
discussed above more successfully. One advantaged group is staff officers who 
experience less sea duty and family separation compared to line officers. Another group 
consists of bachelors or childless couples whose relative flexibility decreases such 
problems. The other group is those married couples where both spouses are in the Navy 
(Derr, 1979). 
In mid-career, which typically is the Lieutenant-Lieutenant Commander ranks, the 
officers have completed 8 to 14 years of service, and are about 27-36 years of age. At this 
phase, the officers are more secure in their careers having already established technical 
competence. During this middle career stage, officers usually start questioning for the 
first time how they have developed as an adult. During this state, they confront feelings 
of imbalance or a need to develop their non-work identity, which might include being 
better parents, being a more considerate and loving spouse, and pursing hobbies. At the 
same time, their career frequently demands very hard work at this stage because of the 
up-or-out policy of being promoted to Lieutenant Commander or being forced to leave 
the Navy. Since fitness reports up to this up-or-out decision point are critical, officers are 
not willing to risk distractions and non-work orientations. 
One other characteristic of the middle stage for officer families is having young 
children at home or in school. During these years, child rearing is more demanding, and 
usually one spouse is looking for help from his or her partner. 
By late mid-career, officers are expected to accomplish most of their tasks by 
managing subordinates, or by working with friends and seniors. Advancement after this 
stage will depend not only on on-the-job productivity, but also on many informal, and 
social criteria related to the behavior of spouses. The role of the spouse, and usually the 
wife, changes from unquestioned supporter to that of an active manager or participator in 
the family’s social obligations. 
During the late career phase of Commander, Captain, and Admiral, both the 
officer and the spouse experience executive roles with increased expectations and 
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responsibilities. They demand to move less to provide more stability for their older 
children. They also start to think about the transformation from active military life to a 
retirement life. 
In summary, the three career phases in the family life of an officer are different, 
and the productivity of an officer is strongly affected by the dynamics of family life in 
these stages. During each phase, support of the spouse affects the performance of the 
officer (Derr, 1979). 
D. A COMPARISON OF CIVILIAN MARKET AND NAVY WORKING 
ENVIRONMENTS AND PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 
The characteristics of the environment used in this study are much different from 
the civilian sector. Of course, there are both strengths and weaknesses in using a data set 
of Navy officers compared to data from a civilian environment. One advantage of using 
data on officers is that, for the Navy, the set of jobs performed, the levels of difficulty, 
and the career paths of officers are very similar in each community.  
Second, training opportunities, ages, and the physical fitness status of military 
officers are automatically controlled because all officers in the same specialty chose 
similar career paths. They are in a very close age range in the paygrades represented in 
our data, and the military organization requires all officers to maintain good physical 
fitness. The officers have many common characteristics. At a specific time and pay grade, 
and for a specific specialty, average ages, formal and firm-specific training attained, 
physical fitness, and tests for military life are much more closer to each other than they 
are for comparable civilian workers. Thus, fewer controls are needed to capture 
individual-specific unobservable characteristics when estimating a model using officer 
data. In other words, the unobservable characteristics for officers vary much less than for 
civilian workers. As discussed earlier, prior researchers who attribute the marriage 
premium to self-selection bias claim that the different unobservable characteristics of 
each individual make it impossible to estimate unbiased parameters. In addition, the 
working environment automatically becomes more observable since the supervisors’ 
evaluation and the promotion of an officer only occurs within his/her specialty, and the 
effects of marital status and family structure on productivity will be reflected by the 
supervisors’ evaluation and help determine promotion. 
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Third, job rotation in the military often affects an officer's performance appraisal 
and it can thus be more objective. A different supervisor every two or three years allows 
the officers to be evaluated by different supervisors. This reduces supervisor-specific 
evaluation bias. Muchinsky (1999) discusses some of these rating biases: Halo errors, 
leniency errors, and central tendency errors.  
Halo errors are biases caused by the supervisor’s general feeling about an 
employee. The supervisor likes or dislikes one feature of an employee, and then tends to 
generalize the employee’s performance based on this feature. For example, if the 
supervisor’s criterion for evaluation of the officer is whether or not the officer has been 
disciplined, upward biased scores for all performance ratings for the officers thought to 
have been ‘disciplined’ will be given. Leniency errors are another type of rating bias. 
Supervisors can be characterized by the leniency of their appraisals. Some supervisors 
tend to give higher scores on average while others tend to give lower scores. The last type 
or central-tendency error refers to a supervisor's tendency to give average scores for 
everybody and to avoid giving extremely high or low scores. 
This study will use the ‘recommendation for accelerated promotion’ element in 
the supervisor's evaluation and the promotion outcome to grade 4 as proxies for ‘on-the-
job productivity.’ Therefore, the more objective the evaluation and the promotion 
outcome, the more reliable the findings of the study will be. 
On the other hand, there are some disadvantages to using a population consisting 
of officers. First, if the supervisor of an organization is the owner of that organization, 
and the supervisor benefits directly from the profits, then the performance of an employee 
is more important to that supervisor. In this case, an employee’s performance directly 
affects the gains or losses of the supervisor. Thus, the owner-supervisor cares more about 
the performance of employees and consequently evaluates them more carefully and more 
objectively. In addition, supervisors will reward or punish employees quickly. In the 
military, by contrast, the supervisor may not gain or lose anything directly from the 
performance of an officer. The supervisors are not owners and the hierarchical structure 
makes it too bureaucratic to reward or quickly punish an officer. The similarity of 
35 
evaluation reports for officers reinforces the impression that supervisors are less 
concerned about the evaluation of their subordinates. 
Second, in the military environment it is difficult to track an officer’s 
accumulated human capital investment because most of the skills needed to perform their 
jobs are gained from military training programs.  Moreover, officers are less free to invest 
in human capital on their own. This feature of the military may have a positive aspect, 
though, in that firm-specific training is similar for all officers. 
Third, though the two proxies of fitness reports and promotion are available to 
measure an officer’s productivity, they are indirect measures compared to civilian studies. 
Fourth, as one of two proxies to measure an officer’s productivity, promotion outcomes 
might have a systematic flaw caused by the ‘up-or-out’ policy. Even though officers 
successfully perform their jobs, they may be forced to leave the military if they are not 
within the number of promotion billets required. Just the opposite may also be true. Even 
though the officer is not appropriate for the next pay grade, he or she may be promoted 
due to a large number of vacancies. In both cases, the promotion outcome is not an ideal 
indication of an officer’s productivity. 
E. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The U.S. Navy has basically two categories of officers – line officers and staff 
officers. The line officer group is composed of the unrestricted line officers, which 
include surface, air, submarine, and special warfare operations, and the restricted line 
officers, which include specialists in engineering, maintenance, intelligence and fleet 
support. The staff officer group, consisting of Chaplain, Civil Engineer, Judge Advocate 
General, Medical, and Supply, serves in professional support functions. However, 
“within each specialty the set of jobs performed, the level of difficulty of the jobs, and 
career paths are similar; also, supervisors’ evaluations and promotion are based solely on 
performance within that specific community” (Bowman and Mehay, 1999). 
Based on the fact that the careers and job environment of two categories of 
officers differ, it can be assumed that when compared to staff officers, line officers 
(except restricted line officers) are more likely to be separated from their family for 
longer periods of time due to deployments at sea. Family separation will affect both the 
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employment opportunities of officer's spouses and the couple’s ability to specialize 
within the household. Consequently, the decision was made to separate officers into two 
groups; (1) Unrestricted line officers (URL), and (2) Staff and restricted line officers 
(STF/RL). The data file for the URL group contains 28,983 observations, while the 
STF/RL group consists of 5,357 observations. 
Table IV.2 provides names and descriptions of the analysis variables used in the 
multivariate models. Coding for some variables was imported from Bowman and 
Mehay’s data file, while other coding was created by the authors of this thesis. 
 
Table IV.2. Description of Variables. 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
PCTRAP12  Percentage of ‘early promotion recommendation’ at grades 1 and 2 (0 – 100) 
PCTRAP3  Percentage of ‘early promotion recommendation’ at grade 3 (0 – 100) 
PROMO Selection for promotion to grade 4 (1: promotee, 0: non-promotee) 
STAY Stayer at O4 promotion review (1: stayer, 0: leaver) 
MARRIED0 Marital status at entry (1: married, 0: single) 
MARRIED1 Marital status at O3 (1: married, 0: single) 
MARRIED2 Marital status at O4 (1: married, 0: single) 
AGE  Entry age (in years) 
PRIOR Prior service experience as enlisted (1: yes, 0: no) 
GRADSCH Graduate school education (1: yes, 0: no) 
GPA College grade point average (1 – 5) 
MILSPS1 Military spouse at O3 (1: yes, 0: no) 
MILSPS2 Military spouse at O4 (1: yes, 0: no) 
USNA Commissioning background (1: Naval Academy, 0: Others) 
ROTC Commissioning background (1: Reserve Officer Training Corps, 0: Others) 
OCS Commissioning background (1: Officer Candidate School, 0: Others) 
NESEP Commissioning background (1: Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program, 0: Others) 
WHITE Ethnicity (1: White, 0: Others) 
AFAM Ethnicity (1: Afro-American, 0: Others) 
OTHERS Ethnicity (1: Non-White and Non-Afam, 0: Others) 





Table IV.2. Description of Variables (cont). 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
SWO Community (1: Surface Warfare, 0: Others) 
SUB Community (1: Submarine, 0: Others) 
PILOT Community (1: Pilot, 0: Others) 
NFO Community (1: Naval Flight, 0: Others) 
OTHERURL Community (1: Other Unrestricted Line, 0: Others) 
RL Community (1: Restricted Line, 0: Others) 
STAFF Community (1: Staff, 0: Others) 
FY85  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY85, 0: Others) 
FY86  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY86, 0: Others) 
FY87  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY87, 0: Others) 
FY88  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY88, 0: Others) 
FY89  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY89, 0: Others) 
FY90  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY90, 0: Others) 
FY91  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY91, 0: Others) 
FY92  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY92, 0: Others) 
FY93  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY93, 0: Others) 
FY94  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY94, 0: Others) 
FY95  Fiscal Year for O4 promotion review (1: FY95, 0: Others) 
 
Table IV.3 depicts the descriptive statistics of key variables separately for two 
different communities – URL and STF/RL – and separately for males and females. Since 
all the previous studies reviewed do not support the wage premium theory across gender, 
the data was sorted by gender. Therefore, the data are divided into four different groups: 
URL male officers, URL female officers, STF/RL male officers, and STF/RL female 
officers. All the values in the table were calculated for each variable without counting 
observations with missing values for that variable. Therefore, the number of observations 
varies across the variables.  
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Table IV.3. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables Disaggregated by Community and 
Gender. 
 
Variable URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female STF/RL Female 
























STAY .4683 .5672 .5859 .4807 
MARRIED0 .2096 .3106 .1087 .1173 
MARRIED1 .4757 .5323 .1225 .1022 
MARRIED2b .8066 .8107 .2785 .3031 
AGE 23.17 24.48 23.95 23.23 
PRIOR .1078 .2269 .1031 .0972 
GRADSCH .1241 .1914 .2284 .1809 
GPA 2.88 3.12 3.18 3.43 
MILSPS1 .0141 .0205 .2280 .2529 
MILSPS2b .0299 .0337 .2980 .2822 
USNA .2536 .0994 .0814 .2295 
ROTC .2729 .1450 .1889 .1708 
OCS .4351 .6437 .6989 .5393 
NESEP .0384 .1120 .0308 .0603 
WHITE .9416 .9420 .9048 .9380 
AFAM .0344 .0323 .0790 .0469 
OTHERS .0240 .0256 .0162 .0151 
GURL .0265 N.I. .8538 N.I. 
SWO .4059 N.I. .0751 N.I. 
SUB .1675 N.I. N.I. N.I. 
PILOT .2585 N.I. .0450 N.I. 
NFO .1393 N.I. .0253 N.I. 
OTHERURL .0023 N.I. .0008 N.I. 
RL N.I. .3034 N.I. .4975 
STAFF N.I. .6966 N.I. .5025 
FY85  .0317 .0574 .0405 .0557 
FY86  .1082 .0389 .1099 .0348 
FY87  .1132 .1293 .1018 .1080 
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Table IV.3. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables Disaggregated by Community and 
Gender (cont). 
 
Variable URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female STF/RL Female 
FY88  .0848 .0785 .0607 .0836 
FY89  .1146 .0648 .1632 .0697 
FY90  .1011 .0889 .1214 .0871 
FY91  .1129 .1215 .1140 .1429 
FY92  .0032 .0781 .0007 .0314 
FY93  .0927 .1004 .1038 .0976 
FY94  .0924 .0981 .0829 .1150 
FY95 .1453 .1441 .1011 .1742 
Notes: aThe numbers in parenthesis show the number of observations in each group excluding those with 
missing values. 
bPROMO, MARRIED2, and MILSPS2 are calculated from those who stay to O4 promotion point. 
All other variables in the table are calculated from those who enter. 
N.I.= not included. 
 
URL males have 6 – 8 percent fewer in ‘early promotion recommendations’ (RAP 
scores) than STF/RL males for the period of grades 1, 2, and 3, while URL females have 
approximately 3 percent fewer RAP scores than STF/RL females. 
In terms of promotions, URL males have a 3 percent higher promotion probability 
than STF/RL male officers, while female officers had almost the same promotion rate in 
each occupational group. Even though STF/RL males gained more ‘early promotion 
recommendations’ than URL males, the fact that they have a lower promotion probability 
seems to reject the correlation between actual promotion and the early promotion 
recommendation. However, as the early promotion recommendation and the actual 
selection for promotion occur in different ways, the link between them does not exactly 
follow a cause and effect relationship. The recommendation for accelerated promotion is 
made by a single supervisor, whereas the selection for promotion is determined by the 
projected need for officers in each grade, branch, and specialty considering selection 
opportunity. 
As regards an officer’s likelihood to stay in the Navy up to the O4 promotion 
review point, STF/RL males are 10 percent more likely to stay in the Navy when 
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compared to URL males, and STF/RL females are 10 percent less likely to stay in the 
Navy when compared to URL females. 
The marital status of each officer group shows that STF/RL officers, when 
compared to URL officers, are more likely to be married at entry and at O3, while the 
difference is 5 – 10 percent among males. There are no differences in marriage rates for 
females. However, marital status differs by gender over time. At the O4 promotion point, 
approximately 80 percent of males from both groups are married while only 28 and 30 
percent of females from the URL and STF/RL groups, respectively, are married. An 
interesting result is that the relationship between marital status and percentage of 
‘recommendation for accelerated promotion’ (PCTRAP12, PCTRAP3) differs by gender. 
Among males, STF/RL officers are more likely to be married at entry and at O3 and they 
received 6 – 8 percent higher RAP scores. Differences are not consistent among females. 
It is too early to say if there is any important relationship between marital status and 
productivity by gender, but the simple statistics show that there might be some links 
between them. This might possibly be connected to specialization issues within a 
household. For example, male officers would spend less time on household activities 
after marriage and consequently allocate more time to the job, while female officers 
might do the opposite in their marriage. 
STF/RL males have a higher entry age than URL males. STF/RL females are 
younger at entry (by .72 years) than URL females. STF/RL males have more enlisted 
experience than URL males by 12 percent, but there is no difference across communities 
for females. Since it is reasonable to assume that those with prior enlisted service, and 
who are older, are better performers than those with no experience, and who are younger, 
the differentials in AGE and PRIOR, if not controlled for, would create biases in 
estimating the effect of marriage on productivity.  
Regarding advanced education, STF/RL males are 5 percent more likely to have 
graduate degrees than URL males, but STF/RL females are 7 percent less likely to have 
graduate degrees than URL females. STF/RL officers have slightly higher grade point 
averages (GPA) than URL officers. As it is believed that a GPA represents an 
individual’s cognitive skills and that a graduate degree improves an individual’s 
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capability to perform a job, these two variables also need to be controlled to estimate 
unbiased marriage effects. 
As regards the commissioning background, URL males are more likely to be 
accessed via the USNA and ROTC while STF/RL males are more likely to have entered 
via OCS and NESEP. URL females are more likely to have entered via ROTC and OCS 
and STF/RL females are more likely to enter via USNA and NESEP.  
Ethnic backgrounds are very similar between URL and STF/RL males. However, 
URL females are more likely to be Afro-American and less likely to be white than 
STF/RL females. The ratio of officers who have military spouses are similar between 
URL and STF/RL officers.  
F. ESTIMATES OF MODELS 
The analysis of the relationship between marital status and on-the-job productivity 
will differ in some aspects from previous studies using civilian data. Wages cannot be 
used as a proxy for the productivity of officers because wages in the military depend 
solely on grade and years of service. Instead, three proxies will be used to measure an 
officer’s productivity, the same proxies used by Bowman and Mehay (1999) to measure 
the productivity of Naval officers. 
The first two proxies are based on the fitness reports of each officer. The 
supervisor’s annual performance appraisals cover the first 10 years of the officer’s career. 
By the tenth year of their career, officers have been promoted twice. However, promotion 
outcomes prior to year 10 are not valid for capturing productivity because the first two 
promotions – to grades 2 and 3 – are almost automatic. Thus, for this 10-year period, the 
best variable to measure officer productivity is the fitness report. For this period, two 
performance models will be built, one analyzing fitness reports for the time spent in 
grades 1 and 2 and one for the time spent in grade 3. These models will analyze the 
determinants of fitness report scores during these time periods. In particular, they will 
model the percentage of fitness reports during each interval that receives a 
‘recommendation for accelerated promotion’ (RAP).  
The third proxy that will be used to measure an officer’s productivity is the 
outcome of whether he or she is promoted to grade 4 at approximately 10 years of service. 
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Promotion to grade 4 is very critical for officers since it is an up-or-out point in their 
career. The productivity of an officer will be measured by using this up-or-out outcome 
as a dependent variable in a binary logit model. 
Table IV.4 tests whether there is a significant difference in the RAP scores for 
those who were promoted versus those who were not promoted. Simple t-tests show that 
the mean value of the ‘early promotion recommendation’ scores is significantly and 
positively correlated with grade 4 promotion. That is, across all four groups ‘promotees’ 
received higher PCTRAP12 scores and higher PCTRAP3 scores than ‘non-promotees.’ In 
the case of PCTRAP12, the RAP scores of eventual promotees is nearly double that of 
eventual non-promotees. For PCTRAP3, the difference narrows, but is still 30 to 50 
percent higher. Receiving a higher proportion of RAP scores during one’s junior officer 
career seems to be an important predictor of eventual promotion for all officers. 
 





Mean (%) T-testb Mean (%) T-test 
N 
(sample size) 
Non-promotees 16.60 55.47 2,907 URL 
Male Promotees 39.55 
-31.07 
(< .0001) 79.49 
-39.69 
(< .0001) 9,140 
Non-promotees 25.54 62.72 719 STF/RL 
Male Promotees 48.73 
-15.24 
(< .0001) 83.15 
-17.67 
(< .0001) 1,915 
Non-promotees 20.82 52.94 334 URL 
Female Promotees 41.21 
-10.46 
(< .0001) 78.96 
-14.35 
(< .0001) 1,125 
Non-promotees 29.21 62.99 63 STF/RL 




(< .0001) 217 
Notes: aSample consists of stayers to O4 promotion review. 
bT-test between ‘Non-promotees’ and ‘Promotees’ groups. The values in parentheses are ‘Pr > 
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V. METHODOLOGY 
As previously discussed, the main objective of this study is to examine whether 
marital status and family structure (dependents) affect the productivity of U.S. Navy 
officers. The four major explanations of the marriage premium identified from the 
literature review are: (1) that it is due to accumulated human capital; (2) that it is due to 
household specialization; (3) that it is due to selection bias; and (4) that it arises from 
employer favoritism. As the military environment differs from the civilian sector, in 
selecting a proxy to measure on-the-job productivity, this study will use a 
‘recommendation for accelerated promotion’ in an officer’s fitness reports as a proxy for 
performance at grades 1 – 3, and promotions to grade 4. 
Our study will have six main parts. For all our models, the simple correlations 
between performance variables and marital and family status variables will be recorded. 
Then, an attempt will be made to estimate the unbiased marriage premium and family 
status variable coefficients with regression models and with two-stage models that 
control for probable selection bias.  
In the first part, the marriage premium for U.S. Naval officers will be calculated 
by dividing marital status into two categories: married and single. Our purpose is to 
measure whether marriage increases the productivity of officers or not. Previous studies 
provide support for both alternatives: marriage increases productivity (Hill 1979; 
Korenman and Neumark 1991; Chun and Lee 2001), and marriage does not increase 
productivity (Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987; Loh 1996; Cornwell and Rupert 1996). After 
our main analysis of marital status and productivity, the focus will be on testing some 
specific hypotheses about the relationship between marital status, family structure and 
productivity based on the literature review.  
The second part of our study will analyze the effects of accumulated years of 
marriage on the marriage premium. Analysis of the marriage premium based on 
accumulated marriage years is, as discussed in the literature review chapter, to determine 
whether the marriage premium increases with the number of years an officer has been 
married. If the premium is found to increase with the number of years married, it can then 
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be concluded that at least some portion of marriage premium is due to increased 
productivity (Kenny 1983; Korenman and Neumark 1991). 
The third part of the thesis will measure the unobservable characteristics of 
officers that are correlated with productivity and selection into marriage. The argument is 
that workers who are potentially more successful are chosen into marriage by their 
spouses or they prefer to marry in higher proportions (Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987; 
Cornwell and Rupert 1996; Ginther and Zavodny 1998). 
The fourth part of the thesis will analyze the effects of the number of dependents 
on performance. Previous studies have hypothesized several possible relationships 
between productivity and dependent status: On the one hand, more dependents may cause 
married workers to specialize less due to the need to spend more time in household work. 
This would result in married officersbeing less productive in market work (Anderson and 
Krieg 2000). An alternative argument is that more dependents mean greater 
responsibility, which causes married men to work harder and perform better (Hill 1979). 
Finally, some analysts have argued that the number of dependents does not affect worker 
productivity (Korenman and Nuemark 1991). 
The fourth part of the thesis will measure the unobservable characteristics of 
officers that are correlated with productivity and selection into marriage. The argument is 
that workers who are potentially more successful are chosen into marriage by their 
spouses or they prefer to marry in higher proportions (Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987; 
Cornwell and Rupert 1996; Ginther and Zavodny 1998). 
In the fifth part of our study, an estimate will be made of whether married officers 
have attained more graduate school education than the single officers. The hypothesis to 
test is whether married workers are more successful because they make more investments 
in human capital (Kenny 1983; Cornwell and Rupert 1997). 
For the last part of the thesis, the ‘two-stage model’ will be used to control for 
unobservables that systematically occur among officers who leave the Navy before the 
O4 promotion review. This analysis will test for the presence of selection bias. 
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A. MARRIAGE PREMIUM BASED ON ‘SINGLE’ AND ‘MARRIED’ 
Table V.1 describes statistics of key variables for each community and gender 
based on marital status at entry. (Note: As the criteria in classifying single and married is 
the marital status at entry, many officers who marry at O3 or O4 are treated as single in 
calculating means of PCTRAP3, PROMO, STAY, etc.) Married officers have higher 
RAP scores than single officers across community and gender groups. PCTRAP12 is 6 – 
8 percent higher and PCTRAP3 is 2 – 7 percent higher for married officers. There is no 
consistent difference in promotion rates between single and married officers. Compared 
to single, married URL officers have a 2 – 8 percent higher promotion rate, but STF.RL 
officers have a 1 – 2 percent lower rate.  
As to an officer’s likelihood to stay in the Navy up to the O4 promotion review 
point, married males are 11 – 19 percent more likely to stay in the Navy when compared 
to single males, and married females are 1 – 2 percent less likely to stay in the Navy 
compared to single females. 
Entry age (AGE), prior enlisted service (PRIOR), advanced education 
(GRADSCH), and grade point average (GPA) show consistent differentials between 
single and married officers across community and gender groups. Married officers are 1 – 
2 years older than single officers and are 12 – 35 percent more likely to have prior 
enlisted service. With respect to advanced education, married officers are 4 – 8 percent 
more likely to have graduate degrees than single officers. Also, married officers have 




Table V.1. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables By Marital Status at Entry. 
 
URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female STF/RL Female 





























































STAY .4454 .5542 .5084 .6995 .5876 .5709 .4820 .4714 
MARRIED1 .3510 .9459 .3497 .9362 .0891 .3964 .0721 .3286 
MARRIED2b .7605 .9462 .7300 .9399 .2491 .5287 .2677 .5758 
AGE 22.79 24.62 23.65 26.32 23.80 25.25 23.11 24.17 
PRIOR .0640 .2716 .1126 .4600 .0900 .2109 .0702 .3000 
GRADSCH .1165 .1542 .1663 .2469 .2191 .3018 .1765 .2143 
GPA 2.87 2.91 3.11 3.14 3.16 3.36 3.42 3.52 
MILSPS1 .0146 .0125 .0211 .0190 .2013 .4436 .2258 .4571 
MILSPS2b .0364 .0108 .0427 .0194 .2943 .3248 .2835 .2727 
USNA .2795 .1575 .1195 .0529 .0865 .0400 .2410 .1429 
ROTC .2976 .1834 .1733 .0834 .1929 .1564 .1689 .1857 
OCS .4028 .5604 .6120 .7151 .6945 .7382 .5351 .5714 
NESEP .0200 .0987 .0951 .1486 .0262 .0655 .0550 .1000 
WHITE .9412 .9434 .9419 .9423 .9073 .8836 .9412 .9143 
AFAM .0344 .0345 .0342 .0278 .0772 .0945 .0455 .0571 
OTHERS .0244 .0221 .0238 .0299 .0155 .0218 .0133 .0286 
GURL .0260 .0284 N.I. N.I. .8421 .9491 N.I. N.I. 
SWO .4030 .4210 N.I. N.I. .0807 .0291 N.I. N.I. 
SUB .1679 .1682 N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I. 
PILOT .2617 .2396 N.I. N.I. .0488 .0145 N.I. N.I. 
NFO .1393 .1396 N.I. N.I. .0275 .0073 N.I. N.I. 
OTHERURL .0020 .0033 N.I. N.I. .0009 .0000 N.I. N.I. 
RL N.I. N.I. .2972 .3128 N.I. N.I. .4991 .4857 
STAFF N.I. N.I. .7028 .6872 N.I. N.I. .5009 .5143 
FY85  .0228 .0587 .0457 .0708 .0385 .0573 .0591 .0303 
FY86  .1095 .1044 .0391 .0388 .1162 .0573 .0315 .0606 
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 Table V.1. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables By Marital Status at Entry (cont). 
 
URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female STF/RL Female 
















FY87  .1145 .1096 .1401 .1125 .1079 .0510 .1142 .0606 
FY88  .0897 .0695 .0836 .0708 .0604 .0573 .0906 .0303 
FY89  .1184 .1041 .0686 .0592 .1691 .1146 .0748 .0303 
FY90  .1019 .0982 .0920 .0844 .1208 .1274 .0866 .0909 
FY91  .1058 .1341 .1203 .1242 .1125 .1274 .1417 .1515 
FY92  .0033 .0029 .0583 .1106 .0008 .0000 .0236 .0909 
FY93  .0859 .1135 .0872 .1222 .0989 .1465 .0945 .1212 
FY94  .0910 .0976 .1028 .0912 .0770 .1338 .1181 .0909 
FY95 .1571 .1073 .1624 .1154 .0981 .1274 .1654 .2424 
Notes: aThe numbers in parenthesis show the number of observations for each variable excluding those of 
missing values. 
bPROMO, MARRIED2, and MILSPS2 are calculated among stayers to O4 promotion review. All 
other variables in the table are calculated among starters at entry. 
N.I.= not included. 
 
Tables V.2 – 4 show the results of two-sample t-tests for the difference in the 
performance proxies – PCTRAP12, PCTRAP3 and PROMO – between single and 
married groups at three points in time (O1, O3, and O4). Table V.2 shows that, except for 
STF/RL females, those who were married when entering the Navy received significantly 
higher ‘accelerated promotion recommendations’ scores during grades 1 and 2 compared 
to single entrants. For URL and STF/RL males, and URL females, officers who were 
married when entering the Navy received 6 – 8 percent more ‘accelerated promotion 
recommendations’ than those who were single.  
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Table V.2. Two-Sample t-test: Differences in PCTRAP12 Based on Marital Status at 
Entry by Community/Gender Group. 
 

















N (sample size) 18,492 5,013 2,906 1,364 2,081 262 486 66 
Mean (%) 28.91 35.38 36.44 42.73 35.88 43.95 38.77 45.99 
T-testa -9.86 (<. 0001) -5.11 (<. 0001) -3.28 (.0011) -1.49 (.1356) 
Notes: aT-test between ‘Single’ and ‘Married’ groups at entry time point. The values in parentheses are 
‘Pr > │t│’ for one-tailed test 
. 
Table V.3 examines the effect of marital status on performance during the six 
years served as an O3. It shows that male officers who were married at O3 received 
higher RAP scores The difference in PCTRAP3 between married and single male officers 
is smaller than the difference in PCTRAP12 Table IV.5, but it is still significant. URL 
male officers who were married received approximately 4 percent more RAP’s, while 
STF/RL male officers received 6 percent more RAP’s. However, there was no difference 
observed among females. 
 
Table V.3. Two-Sample t-test: Differences in PCTRAP3 Based on Marital Status at 
O3. 
 

















N (sample size) 12,077 11,330 1,910 2,299 2,046 281 492 57 
Mean (%) 60.73 64.34 65.52 71.02 66.82 65.52 69.89 69.62 
T-testa -7.87 (< .0001) -5.38 (< .0001) .61 (.5410) .06 (.9526) 
Notes: aT-test between ‘Single’ and ‘Married’ groups at entry time point. The values in parentheses are 
‘Pr > │t│’ for one-tailed test 
 
50 
Table V.4 shows how marital status at the O4 promotion review is related to the 
promotion outcome. A significant marriage premium in terms of the promotion rate is 
observed for URL and STF/RL males who were married at O4 promotion review, but not 
for females. 
 Table V.4. Two-Sample t-test: Differences in PROMO Based on Marital Status at O4. 
 

















N (sample size) 2,396 9,991 511 2,189 1,070 413 200 87 
Mean (ratio) .6757 .7606 .6810 .7209 .7645 .7482 .7650 .7586 
T-testa -8.10 (< .0001) -1.79 (.0728) .66 (.5103) .12 (.9074) 
Notes: aT-test between ‘Single’ and ‘Married’ groups at entry time point. The values in parentheses are 
‘Pr > │t│’ for one-tailed test 
 
In short, these t-tests show that marital status at O1 and at O3, as well as at O4, is 
significantly and positively related to the selected performance measures for both URL 
and STF/RL male officers. On the other hand, a marriage premium is not observed for 
female officers. 
B. ACCUMULATED MARRIAGE YEARS 
The variables in Table V.5 are based on marital status changes between either two 
or three different time points. The variables in the top panel of the table (SS_, SM_, 
MM_, and DW_) measure changes in marital status between O1 (in col. 1) and O3 (in col. 
2). For example, the variable SM_ is coded as 1 for those who are single at entry and 
married at O3, and MM_ shows someone who is married throughout this period. DW_ is 
coded as 1 for those who are divorced or widowed throughout grades 1 and 2. 
The variables in the second panel (_SS, _SM, _MM, and _DW) measure marital 
changes between O3 and O4. For example, the variable _SM is coded 1 for officers who 
are single at O3 and married at O4, whereas _MM reflects an officer who is married 
throughout the six years as an O3. 
The variables in the third panel (SSS, SSM, SMM, MMM, DW) reflect all marital 
changes between O1 and O4. For example, the variable SMM is coded 1 for those who 
are single at entry, married at O3, and married at O4, while MMM reflects someone who 
is married throughout the 10-year period. Among other things, these variables allow us to 
measure accumulated years of marriage. 
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In the last column of Table V.5, ‘accumulated years of marriage’ is calculated 
using the following logic (see Figure V.1). Marriage status is observed at three time 
points: at entry (Point A), at the grade 3 promotion review (Point B), and at the grade 4 
promotion review (Point C). The period from O1 to O3 usually covers 4 years, and the 
period from O3 to O4 covers 6 years. For the next step, marital status changes are 
assumed to occur at the mid-point of each time interval. Thus, if a person who is single at 
entry marries between entry (at the beginning of year1) and O3 (at the end of year 4), he 
is assumed to marry at the mid-point of the interval, the end of year 2 (or the beginning of 
year 3). Someone who marries between O3 (at the beginning of year 5) and O4 (at the 
end of year 10) is assumed to marry at the mid-point of years 7 and 8. 
 
Table V.5. Description of Marital Status Change Variables and Accumulated Years of 
Marriage Years. 
 
Marital Status as of: Variable 
Name O1 O3 O4 
Average 
Accumulated Years  
of Marriage 
Panel 1. Changes Between O1-O3 
SS_ Single Single 0 
SM_ Single Married 2 
MM_ Married Married 4 
DW_ Div/Widow Div/Widow 
N.I. 
N.I. 
Panel 2. Changes Between O3-O4 
_SS Single Single 0 
_SM Single Married 3 
_MM Married Married 6 
_DW 
N.I. 
Div/Widow Div/Widow N.I. 
Panel 3. Changes Between O1-O3 and O3-O4 
SSS Single Single Single 0 
SSM Single Single Married 3 
SMM Single Married Married 8 
MMM Married Married Married 10 
DW Div/Widow Div/Widow Div/Widow N.I. 
Notes: N.I.= not included. 
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 Grade: 
  1         2         3         4        5         6         7         8         9       10 





Figure V.1. Officer Career Path and Marriage Points. 
 
Notes: A: Marital status at entry (MARRIED0). 
 B: Marital status at O3 (MARRIED1). 
 C: Marital status at O4 (MARRIED2). 
 
Table V.6 shows the number of observations for each marital status change 
variable created in Table V.5. The figure in parenthesis is the column percentage for each 
panel. 
Table V.6. Data on Marital Status Change Variables (Accumulated Years of 
Marriage). 
 
Variable URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female STF/RL Female 
Average Accumulated 
Years of Marriage 
Panel 1. Changes Between O1-O3 (at the beginning of year 1 and year 5) 
SS_ 13,374(.50)a 2,084(.44) 2,004(.79) 476(.80) 0 
SM_ 7,315(.28) 1,143(.24) 201(.08) 38(.06) 2 
MM_ 5,229(.20) 1,380(.29) 109(.04) 23(.04) 4 
DW_ 462(.02) 139(.03) 216(.09) 60(.10) N.I. 
Panel 2. Changes Between O3-O4 (at the beginning of year 5 and year 11) 
_SS 1,998(.16) 400(.15) 985(.66) 184(.63) 0 
_SM 3,739(.30) 596(.22) 259(.17) 58(.20) 3 
_MM 6,141(.49) 1,555(.57) 142(.10) 21(.07) 6 
_DW 586(.05) 165(.06) 109(.07) 31(.10) N.I. 
Panel 3. Changes Between O1-O3 and O3-O4 (at the beginning of year 1, year 5, and year 11) 
SSS 1,974(.16) 392(.15) 928(.65) 175(.63) 0 
SSM 3,643(.30) 566(.21) 237(.17) 52(.19) 3 
SMM 3,350(.27) 626(.23) 84(.06) 10(.03) 8 
MMM 2,776(.22) 924(.35) 58(.04) 11(.04) 10 
DW 594(.05) 167(.06) 109(.08) 31(.11) N.I. 
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Notes: aThe numbers in parenthesis show the percentages of the column in each panel.  
Descriptive statistics of the performance variables and correlation coefficients 
between performance and accumulated marriage years are calculated in Tables V.7 – 12 
for 13 different groups. STF/RL female officers are excluded because of the small sample 
sizes. Thereafter, several groups are created based on the changes in marital status at 
different combinations of three time points. These tables present data separately for URL 
males, STF/RL males, and URL females. 
Tables V.7 shows the three primary performance measures for URL males and for 
each marital status change between O1 and O4. The table shows that performance tends 
to rise with the length of marriage. This is reinforced in Table V.8, which shows that 
correlation coefficients between performance and years of marriage are positive and 
significant. For example, compared to single URL males with 0 marriage years (SS_), 
males with 4 marriage years (MM_) receive 7 percent more RAPs during grades 1 and 2 
while males with two years of marriage (SM_) receive 2 percent more RAPs. 
Table V.7. Performance Measures by Marital Change for URL Males. 
 




Panel 1. Changes Between O1-O3 (at the beginning of year 1 and year 5) 
SS_ 28.30 11,729 0 
SM_ 30.02 6,619 2 




Panel 2. Changes Between O3-O4 (at the beginning of year 5 and year 11) 
_SS 70.72 1,924 0 
_SM 74.42 3,676 3 






Panel 3. Changes Between O1-O3 and O3-O4 (at the beginning of year 1, year 5, and year 11) 
SSS .6737 1,974 0 
SSM .7598 3,643 3 
SMM .7657 3,350 8 
MMM .7619 2,776 10 
DW 
N.I. N.I. 
.6820 500 N.I. 
Notes:  aValue in each cell is mean of the performance variable. 
N.I.= not included. 
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Table V.8. Correlation Coefficients Between Performance Measures and Years of 
Marriage (or Divorce) for URL Malesa. 
 














Notes:  aEach cell includes correlation coefficient and the number of observations in parenthesis. 
bAccumulated Years of Marriage: is coded as 3 values (1: SS_, 2: SM_, 3: MM_) for PCTRAP12, 
3 values (1: _SS, 2: _SM, 3: _MM) for PCTRAP3, and 4 values (1: SSS, 2: SSM, 3: SMM, 4: 
MMM) for PROMO. 
cDivorce Experience: is coded as 2 values (1: SS_, 2: DW_) for PCTRAP12, 2 values (1: _SS, 2: 
_DW) for PCTRAP3, and 2 values (1: SSS, 2: DW) for PROMO. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
 
URL males who divorced or were widowed during grade 3 (_DW) are 
significantly and negatively correlated with RAP scores (PCTRAP3) when compared to 
single males. Divorced URL males receive 2 percent fewer RAP scores than those in _SS. 
However, URL males who divorced or were widowed either at O1 or O4 (DW_, DW) 
revealed no correlation with performance variables. 
The results from Table V.9 show that for STF/RL males the performance proxies 
do not increase with the length of marriage. Only RAPs gained during grades 1 and 3 
(PCTRAP12) increase with accumulated marriage time. RAPs gained during grade 3 
(PCTRAP3) and the promotion probability (PROMO) decrease with the length of 
marriage. For example, compared to 2 years of marriage (SM_) males with 4 years of 
marriage (MM_) receive 7 percent more RAPs during grades 1 and 2. During grade 3, 
however, males married 3 years (_SM) receive 1 percent more RAPs than those married 
6 years (_MM). The promotion probability (PROMO) for males married 10 years 
(MMM) is 5 percent lower than for males married 3 years (SSM).  
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Table V.9. Performance Measures by Marital Change for STF/RL Males. 
 





Panel 1. Changes Between O1-O3 (at the beginning of year 1 and year 5) 
SS_ 36.67 1,829 0 
SM_ 36.04 1,035 2 




Panel 2. Changes Between O3-O4 (at the beginning of year 5 and year 11) 
_SS 73.51 389 0 
_SM 79.24 588 3 






Panel 3. Changes Between O1-O3 and O3-O4 (at the beginning of year 1, year 5, and year 11) 
SSS .6811 392 0 
SSM .7438 566 3 
SMM .7444 626 8 
MMM .6937 924 10 
DW 
N.I. N.I. 
.6644 149 N.I. 
Notes:  aValue in each cell is mean of the performance variable. 
N.I.= not included. 
 
Table V.10. Correlation Coefficients Between Performance Measures and Years of 
Marriage (or Divorce) for STF/RL Malesa. 
 














Notes:  aEach cell includes correlation coefficient, and the number of observations in parenthesis. 
bAccumulated Years of Marriage: is coded as 3 values (1: SS_, 2: SM_, 3: MM_) for PCTRAP12, 
3 values (1: _SS, 2: _SM, 3: _MM) for PCTRAP3, and 4 values (1: SSS, 2: SSM, 3: SMM, 4: 
MMM) for PROMO. 
cDivorce Experience: is coded as 2 values (1: SS_, 2: DW_) for PCTRAP12, 2 values (1: _SS, 2: 
_DW) for PCTRAP3, and 2 values (1: SSS, 2: DW) for PROMO. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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However, Table V.10 shows a significant and positive correlation between time 
married and PCTRAP12 and PCTRAP3. With respect to divorce, STF/RL males who 
divorced or widowed either at O1, O3, or O4 (DW_, _DW, and DW) show no significant 
correlation with fitness report scores or promotion outcomes when compared to single 
males.  
Tables V.11 – 12 show the same relationships for URL females. Fitness report 
scores during grades 1 and 2 (PCTRAP12) are significantly and positively correlated with 
accumulated years of marriage, even though officers married 2 years (SM_) receive 3 
percent lower RAP scores when compared to singles (SS_). In contrast, RAP scores 
during grade 3 (PCTRAP3) and promotion probabilities (PROMO) are not significantly 
correlated with ‘accumulated marriage years.’ URL females who divorced or widowed 
either at O1 or at O3 or O4 (DW_, _DW, and DW) also are not correlated with fitness 
reports or promotion when compared to single males. 
In summary, the relationship between performance proxies and accumulated 
marriage years differ among the three groups. For URL males, all three performance 
proxies are significantly and positively correlated with years married. STF/RL males’ 
RAP scores during grades 1, 2, and 3 (PCTRAP12 and PCTRAP3) are significantly and 
positively related to accumulated marriage years, but promotion probability is not 
correlated with years of marriage. For URL females, RAP scores during grades 1 and 2 
(PCTRAP12 only) have a significant and positive correlation, but PCTRAP3 and 
PROMO are not correlated with years of marriage. As regards divorce, in all cases, 
except for the case of PCTRAP3 in URL males, there is no correlation between 
performance proxies and divorce status. 
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Table V.11. Performance Measures by Marital Change for URL Females. 





Panel 1. Changes Between O1-O3 (at the beginning of year 1 and year 5) 
SS_ 1,857 0 
SM_ 175 2 




Panel 2. Changes Between O3-O4 (at the beginning of year 5 and year 11) 
_SS 71.74 966 0 
_SM 77.58 259 3 









72.15 104 N.I. 
Panel 3. Changes Between O1-O3 and O3-O4 (at the beginning of year 1, year 5, and year 11) 




.7426 237 3 
SMM .6905 84 8 
MMM .8276 58 10 
DW .7423 97  N.I. 
Notes:  aValue in each cell is mean of the performance variable. 
N.I.= not included. 
 
Table V.12. Correlation Coefficients Between Performance Measures and Years of 
Marriage (or Divorce) for URL Females . a
 














Notes:  aEach cell includes correlation coefficient, and the number of observations in parenthesis. 
bAccumulated Years of Marriage: is coded as 3 values (1: SS_, 2: SM_, 3: MM_) for PCTRAP12, 
3 values (1: _SS, 2: _SM, 3: _MM) for PCTRAP3, and 4 values (1: SSS, 2: SSM, 3: SMM, 4: 
MMM) for PROMO. 
cDivorce Experience: is coded as 2 values (1: SS_, 2: DW_) for PCTRAP12, 2 values (1: _SS, 2: 
_DW) for PCTRAP3, and 2 values (1: SSS, 2: DW) for PROMO. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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C. SELECTION INTO MARRIAGE 
For officers who were single during grades 1 and 2, two groups were created: one 
group that will marry when they reach grade 3 (SSM) and a second group that will not 
marry (SSS). By comparing these two groups’ average performances on their fitness 
reports, the goal was to determine whether officers who will marry in the future receive 
higher performance scores when they were single compared to single officers who will 
remain single in the future. 
In Table V.13, values of PCTRAP12 during grades 1 and 2 were compared 
between SSS and SSM officers to identify differences in current outcomes for those to be 
married in the future. Officers in both groups were single for the period during grades 1 
and 2 from which PCTRAP12 is drawn, but during grade 3 officers in SSM were married 
while those in SSS remained single. Therefore, the differential in PCTRAP12 may 
indicate some unobserved characteristics between the two groups that may cause 
potentially more successful officers to marry in higher percentages. 
 
Table V.13. Two-Sample t-test: Selection into Marriage Analysisa. 
 
URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female 
 
SSS SSM SSS SSM SSS SSM 
N 1,962 3,641 403 579 960 246 
PCTRAP12 (%) 29.63 33.16 39.71 42.67 36.61 33.46 
T-testb -3.14 (.0017) -1.22 (.2228) 1.21 (.2215) 
Notes: aSample consists of stayers to O4 promotion review.  
bT-test between ‘not to be married’ and ‘to be married’ groups at entry time point. The values in 
parentheses are ‘Pr > │t│’ for one-tailed test. 
  
The results show that for URL males, the to-be-married (SSM) group has 
approximately 4 percent more PCTRAP12 scores than the SSS group, which is a 
significant difference (t-test = -3.14). For STF/RL males, the difference is approximately 
3 percent higher for the to-be-marrieds, but it is not significant. The difference is 3 
percent smaller for SSM of URL females, just the opposite of the male groups, but this 
result is not significant. The only significant results for URL males suggest that some 
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amount of the marriage premium may be due to unobservable characteristics of officers 
that are correlated with both more successful performers and selection into marriage. 
D. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS 
The variables in Table V.14 show the coding of dependents at three time points. 
 
Table V.14. Description of Dependents Variables (Number of Dependents). 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
NONDEP0/1/2 Number of dependents at entry/O3/O4 (1: single with no child, 0: others) 
SPSONLY0/1/2 Number of dependents at entry/O3/O4 (1: spouse only, 0: others) 
SPS_1CH0/1/2 Number of dependents at entry/O3/O4 (1: spouse + 1 child, 0: others) 
SPS_2CH0/1/2 Number of dependents at entry/O3/O4 (1: spouse + 2 children, 0: others) 
SPS_3CH0/1/2 Number of dependents at entry/O3/O4 (1: spouse + 3 or more children, 0: others) 
DIVCH0/1/2 Number of dependents at entry/O3/O4 (1: divorced with children, 0: others) 
 
Table V.15 depicts the descriptive statistics of the dependents variables separately 
for URL and STF/RL males and URL females. STF/RL males have more dependents 
than URL males over time, which is reinforced by the fact that STF/RL males are more 
likely to be married at O1 and at O3.  
 
Table V.15. Descriptive Statistics of Dependents Variables (Number of Dependents) 
By Community and Gender. 
 
Variable URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female 
NONDEP0/1/2 .79a/ .52b/ .17c .69/ .45/ .16 .94/ .85/ .69 
SPSONLY0/1/2 .15/ .32/ .24 .17/ .28/ .19 .04/ .09/ .13 
SPS_1CH0/1/2 .03/ .09/ .21 .07/ .11/ .20 .01/ .03/ .07 
SPS_2CH0/1/2 .02/ .05/ .25 .05/ .10/ .28 .01/ .01/ .06 
SPS_3CH0/1/2 .01/ .01/ .11 .02/ .04/ .14 .00/ .00/ .01 
DIVCH0/1/2 .00/ .01/ .02 .00/ .02/ .03 .00/ .02/ .04 
Note: aThe first figure is the percentages of the column based on dependents at entry. 
 bThe second figure is the percentages of the column based on dependents at O3. 
cThe third figure is the percentages of the column based on dependents at O4. 
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At entry, STF/RL males are less likely to be single and more likely to have 
dependents when compared to URL males. At O3, STF/RL males are still less likely to 
be single and to have ‘spouse only’ as dependent but they are more likely to have ‘spouse 
+ child(ren).’ Also, at O4, STF/RL males are less likely to be single and to have ‘spouse 
only’ and ‘spouse + child’ but they are still more likely to have ‘spouse + children.’ 
Tables V.16 – 21 examine the effect of ‘number of dependents’ and make three 
comparisons: (1) a comparison of PCTRAP12 by dependents at O1, which differs in the 
number of dependents for the period of grades 1 and 2; (2) a comparison of PCTRAP3 by 
dependents for the period of grade 3; (3) and a comparison of PROMO by dependents for 
the entire period from entry to O4. 
Table V.16. URL Male Officers: Descriptive Statistics of Performance Proxies and 
Number of Dependents. 
 
Group PCTRAP12a PCTRAP3a PROMOa N (sample size) 
Number of 
Dependents 
Panel 1. Dependents at entry (at the beginning of year 1) 
NONDEP0 28.93 18,365 0 
SPSONLY0 34.73 3,466 1 
SPS_1CH0 35.18 776 2 
SPS_2CH0 38.20 526 3 
SPS_3CH0 40.14 
N.I. N.I. 
164 4≥  
Panel 2. Dependents at O3 (at the beginning of year 5) 
NONDEP1 60.71 11,881 0 
SPSONLY1 64.10 7,617 1 
SPS_1CH1 64.32 2,153 2 





376 4≥  
Panel 3. Dependents at O4 (at the beginning of year 11) 
NONDEP2 .6742 2,155 0 
SPSONLY2 .7602 2,978 1 
SPS_1CH2 .7768 2,576 2 
SPS_2CH2 .7678 3,105 3 
SPS_3CH2 
N.I. N.I. 
.7132 1,332 4≥  
Notes:  aValue in each cell is mean of the performance proxies. 
N.I.= not included. 
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Table V.17. URL Male Officer: Correlation Coefficient of Performance Proxies with 
Number of Dependentsa. 
 









Notes:  aEach cell includes correlation coefficient, and the number of observations in parenthesis. 
bNumber of Dependents: is coded as 5 values (0: NONDEP, 1: SPSONLY, 2: SPS_1CH, 3: 
SPS_2CH, 4: SPS_3CH) at entry, O3, and O4 for PCTRAP12, PCTRAP3, and PROMO, 
respectively. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
 
As shown in Tables V.16 – 17, for URL males, ‘the number of dependents’ is 
significantly and positively correlated with ‘early promotion recommendations’ 
(PCTRAP12 and PCTRAP3). Also, URL males with dependents (spouse only or spouse 
+ children) are more likely to be promoted to grade 4 compared to those without 
dependents, but the increased number of dependents does not consistently increase the 
promotion probability. 
Tables V.18 – 19 show results for STF/RL males. RAP scores during grades 1/2 
and 3 (PCTRAP12, PCTRAP3) are significantly and positively correlated with the 
number of dependents, but promotion (PROMO) is not correlated. Even though STF/RL 
males with dependents (spouse only or spouse + children) are more likely to be promoted 
to grade 4 compared to those without dependents, the increased number of dependents 











Table V.18. STF/RL Male Officers: Descriptive Statistics of Performance Proxies and 
Number of Dependents. 
 
Group PCTRAP12a PCTRAP3a PROMOa N (sample size) 
Number of 
Dependents 
Panel 1. Dependents at entry (at the beginning of year 1) 
NONDEP0 36.26 2,857 0 
SPSONLY0 43.66 715 1 
SPS_1CH0 37.86 294 2 
SPS_2CH0 44.94 253 3 
SPS_3MCH0 47.74 
N.I. N.I. 
79 4≥  
Panel 2. Dependents at O3 (at the beginning of year 5) 
NONDEP1 65.20 1,843 0 
SPSONLY1 68.95 1,208 1 
SPS_1CH1 73.59 500 2 





154 4≥  
Panel 3. Dependents at O4 (at the beginning of year 11) 
NONDEP2 .6848 441 0 
SPSONLY2 .7553 523 1 
SPS_1CH2 .7081 531 2 
SPS_2CH2 .7241 743 3 
SPS_3CH2 
N.I. N.I. 
.6862 392 4≥  
Notes:  aValue in each cell is mean of the performance proxies. 
N.I.= not included. 
 
Table V.19. STF/RL Male Officer: Correlation Coefficient of Performance Proxies 
with Number of Dependentsa. 
 









Notes:  aEach cell includes correlation coefficient, and the number of observations in parenthesis. 
bNumber of Dependents: is coded as 5 values (0: NONDEP, 1: SPSONLY, 2: SPS_1CH, 3: 
SPS_2CH, 4: SPS_3CH) at entry, O3, and O4 for PCTRAP12, PCTRAP3, and PROMO, 
respectively. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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Tables V.20 – 21 present results for URL females. It is difficult to generalize the 
relationship between PCTRAP12 and the number of dependents due to small sample 
sizes in some groups. However, correlation coefficients show that RAP scores during 
grades 1 and 2 are significantly and positively correlated with the number of dependents. 
In other words, URL females with dependents (spouse only or spouse + children) are 
more likely to receive RAPs for the four-year period of grades 1 and 2 (PCTRAP12). In 
contrast to PCTRAP12, there is no significant correlation between the number of 
dependents and ‘early promotion recommendations’ for the grade 3 period (PCTRAP3) 
or promotion. 
 
Table V.20. URL Female Officers: Descriptive Statistics of Performance Proxies and 
Number of Dependents. 
 
Group PCTRAP12a PCTRAP3a PROMOa N (sample size) 
Number of 
Dependents 
Panel 1. Dependents at entry (at the beginning of year 1) 
NONDEP0 36.04 2,037 0 
SPSONLY0 45.34 98 1 
SPS_1CH0 51.11 21 2 
SPS_2CH0 50.63 8 3 
SPS_3CH0 0 
N.I. N.I. 
1 4≥  
Panel 2. Dependents at O3 (at the beginning of year 5) 
NONDEP1 66.75 1,990 0 
SPSONLY1 63.08 198 1 
SPS_1CH1 75.47 61 2 





2 4≥  
Panel 3. Dependents at O4 (at the beginning of year 11) 
NONDEP2 .7704 1,015 0 
SPSONLY2 .7641 195 1 
SPS_1CH2 .7593 108 2 
SPS_2CH2 .7222 90 3 
SPS_3CH2 
N.I. N.I. 
.6500 20 4≥  
Notes:  aValue in each cell is mean of the performance proxies. 
N.I.= not included. 
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Table V.21. URL Female Officer: Correlation Coefficient of Performance Proxies with 
Number of Dependentsa. 
 









Notes:  aEach cell includes correlation coefficient, and the number of observations in parenthesis. 
bNumber of Dependents: is coded as 5 values (0: NONDEP, 1: SPSONLY, 2: SPS_1CH, 3: 
SPS_2CH, 4: SPS_3CH) at entry, O3, and O4 for PCTRAP12, PCTRAP3, and PROMO, 
respectively. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
In short, like the results in the relationship between performance proxies and 
accumulated marriage years, a greater number of dependents is not consistently 
correlated with performance. That is, for URL males, all three proxies are significantly 
and positively correlated with an increasing number of dependents, whereas for STF/RL 
males, PCTRAP12 and PCTRAP3 are positively correlated, and for URL females only 
PCTRAP12 is positively correlated with dependents.  
E. HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
Tables V.22 – 23 present how accumulated years of marriage affect officers’ 
human capital investment in graduate school education. For URL and STF/RL males, 
years of marriage are positively correlated with graduate degrees. Compared to singles 
(SSS), males who have been married for 3 years (SSMs) are 5 – 7 percent more likely to 
have a graduate degree, while those with 8 years of marriage (SMM) are 7 – 9 percent 
more likely to have a graduate degree. However, marriage years during grade 1 do not 
seem to influence graduate degrees among males. 
  
Table V.22. Graduate Degrees (in percent) by Marital Change and Officer Group. 
 




Ratio N Ratio N Ratio 
Average 
Accumulated 
Years of Marriage 
SSS 1,974 .1976 392 .2372 928 .3511 0 
SSM 3,643 .2435 566 .3004 237 .3629 3 
SMM 3,350 .2651 626 .3227 84 .3571 8 
MMM 2,776 .2662 924 .3258 58 .4483 10 
DW 594 .1768 167 .2395 109 .3028 N.I. 
Notes:  N.I.= not included. 
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Table V.23. Correlation Coefficient of Graduate Degree (GRADSCH) and 
Accumulated Years of Marriage (or Divorce Experience) by Officer Groupa. 
 














Notes:  aEach cell includes correlation coefficient, and the number of observations in parenthesis. 
bAccumulated Years of Marriage: is coded as 4 values (1: SSS, 2: SSM, 3: SMM, 4: MMM). 
cDivorce Experience: is coded as 2 values (1: SSS, 2: DW). 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
 
In contrast to males, URL females’ graduate school education does not differ 
much among groups with 0, 3, and 8 years of marriage (SSS, SSM, SMM). However, 
marriage years during grade 1 seem to have a strong effect on female graduate school 
education: MMM females are 11 percent more likely to have a graduate school education 
than SSS. URL males and females divorced or widowed either at O1, or at O3, or at O4 
are 2 – 5 percent less likely to have graduate education than SSS but these results are not 
significant. 
F. NONRANDOM SAMPLE SELECTION 
From Table V.3, approximately 50 percent of officers leave the Navy during their 
first 10 years between entry and O4 promotion review. Almost all attrition occurs during 
grade 3. In general, leavers can be categorized into two types. One type is leavers who 
are poor performers and have a promotion probability that is below average. On the other 
hand, leavers are officers of above average skills who think they will be better off in the 
civilian sector. If the Navy data have one of these characteristics for leavers, then models 
of two performance proxies (PCTRAP3 and PROMO) will obtain biased estimators. In 
other words, if attrition of the Navy officers is systematically correlated with 
unobservables, it may bias estimators of performance measures due to nonrandom sample 
selection. 
Tables V.24 – 25 presents whether retention differs between ‘not married’ and 
‘married,’ and whether promotion rates differ between starters and stayers. The data are 
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divided into four groups based on officer community and gender. Thereafter, the four 
groups are divided again into two sub groups based on marriage experience. The ‘not 
married’ group contains all officers who are not married at either grades 1 – 2 or grade 3 
while the ‘married’ group contains all officers who are married either at grades 1 – 2 or 
grade 3. The number of stayers, leavers, and promotees, and the retention and promotion 
rates, are calculated for each group. 
 
Table V.24. Two-Sample t-test: Differences in Retention based on Marriage 
Experience. 
 
URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female STF/RL Female  
Not 
Marrieda Married





Startersc 13,374 13,005 2,084 2,661 2,004 526 476 121 
Stayersd 5,667 6,684 968 1,726 1,184 298 223 54 
Leaverse 7,707 6,321 1,116 935 820 228 243 67 
RRf .4237 .5140 .4645 .6486 .5908 .5665 .4895 .4463 
T-testg -14.74 (< .0001) -12.86 (<. 0001) 1.01 (.3146) .85 (.3964) 
Notes: aNot Married: Those who are single at O-1 and O-3 as well. 
bMarried: Those who are married either at O-1 or /and O-3. 
cStarters: Sample size of officers who entered the Navy. 
dStayers: Number of officers who stayed the Navy at O4 promotion review. 
eLeavers: Number of officers who left the Navy between entry and O4 promotion review. 
fRetention rate = Stayers/Starters. 
gT-test between ‘Single’ and ‘Married’ groups at entry time point. The values in parentheses are 
‘Pr > │t│’ for one-tailed test 
 
The t-tests show that the retention rate is 9 and 19 percent higher for married male 
URL and STF/RL officers, respectively. For married URL females, retention is 2 percent 







Table V.25. Promotion Rate based on Marriage Experience. 
 
URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female STF/RL Female  
Not 
Marrieda Married





Startersc 13,374 13,005 2,084 2,661 2,004 526 476 121 
Stayersd 5,667 6,684 968 1,726 1,184 298 223 54 
Promoteese 4,129 5,063 695 1,227 893 233 180 39 
PR1f .3087 .3893 .3385 .4611 .4456 .4430 .3782 .3223 
PR2g .7286 .7575 .7180 .7109 .7542 .7819 .7725 .7222 
Notes: aNot Married: Those who are single at O-1 and O-3 as well. 
bMarried: Those who are married either at O-1 or /and O-3. 
cStarters: Sample size of officers who entered the Navy. 
dStayers: Number of officers who stayed the Navy at O4 promotion review. 
eNumber of promotees to the grade 4. 
fPromotion rate 1 = Promotees/Starters. 
gPromotion rate 2 = Promotees/Stayers. 
 
In Table V.25, promotion rate 1 (PR1 = Promotees/Starters) is 8 and 12 percent 
higher for male married URL and STF/RL officers, respectively. However, promotion 
rate 2 (PR2 = Promotees/Stayers) is only 3 percent higher for married URL males and 
there is no difference between single and married STF/RL male officers. In other words, 
when the promotion rate is calculated based on the officers who stayed until the 
promotion review, the apparent marriage premium almost disappears for males. For URL 
females, there seems little difference in promotion rates between ‘married’ and ‘not 
married’ officers. 
Since males have a significantly different retention behavior between ‘not 
married’ and ‘married’ officers and that a large portion of the promotion rate differential 
disappears when promotees are divided by stayers, the thesis will use a ‘two-stage model’ 







In the first part of this chapter, we analyze the marriage premium using basic 
single stage regression models. We analyze the first two performance models 
(PCTRAP12 and PCTRAP3) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression techniques, 
and analyze the promotion model using maximum likelihood probit models. By using 
Naval officer data, we test five main arguments about the marriage premium and 
dependent status discussed in the literature review chapter: 
1. Marriage Premium Based on ‘Married’ and ‘Single’: Analyzing the direct 
effect of marriage on the productivity of officers. The ‘Married’ and 
‘Single’ groups are officers who are married or single during the period 
the performance proxy covers. 
 
2. Accumulated Years of Marriage: Estimating the effect of years of 
marriage on performance. If performance increases with accumulated 
years of marriage, it implies a positive effect of marriage on productivity. 
 
3. Selection into Marriage: Estimating the performance of two officer groups 
while they were single. One group will marry in the future, and the other 
group will remain single. If the first group performs better, we can 
conclude that the apparent higher performance of married officers may be 
overstated due to unobservable characteristics of the officers. 
 
4. Number of Dependents: Estimating the effects of dependents on the 
performance of officers. 
 
5. Human Capital Investment: Measuring the relationship between marital 
status and graduate school completion. Higher investment in human 
capital signals greater productivity. 
In the second part of the chapter, we use ‘two-stage’ models to correct for 
potential biases caused by officers who leave the Navy prior to the O4 promotion review. 
Since two of our basic models (PCTRAP3 and PROMO) are based on officers who 
remain in the Navy, these models do not include the effects of officers who leave the 
Navy earlier, which may bias the marriage premium coefficients. 
A. BASIC MODEL RESULTS 
1. Marriage Premium Based on ‘Married’ and ‘Single’ 
For the three different performance variables, we estimate the marriage premium 
in three successive regression models for each of the three officer groups. In the first 
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model we control for commissioning background, ethnicity, age and prior enlisted service 
experience. In the second model, we add college grade point average (GPA), and in the 
third model we add major officer sub-specialties (communities) as control variables. For 
the promotion outcome model we add dummy variables for the fiscal years of the 
promotion boards to control for varying promotion opportunities over time. The 
promotion outcome is not only a function of an officer’s productivity, but it is also 
affected by the available positions in the next higher grade in the year an officer is 
evaluated for the promotion. Thus, omitting the fiscal year dummies would cause bias in 
estimates. Table VI.1 shows the coefficients and marginal effects of the marital status 
variables for URL males. 
As we add more control variables in the rating performance (PCTRAP12 and 
PCTRAP3) models for URL males, the coefficients of marital status change only slightly. 
The results of the third model, which includes all control variables, show that URL 
officers who were married when they entered the Navy received 23.6 percent more 
RAP’s during grades 1 and 2 than officers who were single at entry. During grade 3, 
officers who were married at the beginning of grade 3 received 5.7 percent more RAP’s 
during grade 3 than officers who were single at the beginning of the grade 3 period. At 
the O4 promotion review officers who were married at that time were 8.7 percentage 
points more likely to be promoted. 
In all models, college grade point average (GPA), graduate school education 
(GRADSCH) and prior enlisted experience (PRIOR) are significantly and positively 
correlated with the performance variables. Age and ethnicity other than white are 
negatively correlated with performance. Interestingly, most of the commissioning source 
variables compared to OCS have a significant and positive effect on performance, 
whereas some of the community variables do not have a significant effect. 
Anderson and Krieg (2000) find similar relationships between marriage and 
performance of U.S. Marine Corps enlisted personnel. They find that married Marines 
receive higher performance evaluation scores than single Marines. They also find that 
married Marines have a higher promotion probability than single Marines. 
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Table VI.1. Performance Models for URL Malesa. 
 
Variable PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 




(.719) -- -- -- -- -- -- 




(.496) -- -- -- 










GURL -- -- -17.71*** (2.210) -- -- 
-16.38*** 
(2.074) -- -- 
-.803*** 
(.125) 
SUB -- -- 4.214*** (.873) -- -- 
5.677*** 
(.761) -- -- 
-.021 
(.044) 
PILOT -- -- -18.30*** (.712) -- -- 
-4.646*** 
(.625) -- -- 
-.106*** 
(.034) 
NFO -- -- -13.34*** (.835) -- -- 
1.793*** 
(.726) -- -- 
-.139*** 
(.036) 









































































































































Intercept 53.949 29.568 47.179 73.602 57.445 59.073 2.301 1.770 1.933 
N 23,464 19,629 19,629 23,363 19,583 19,583 12,351 11,640 11,640 
R2 .0114 .0226 .0696 .0207 .0480 .0596 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
-2 LOG L N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 13,692.10 12,648.91 12,592.97 
Dep. Mean 30.30 30.19 30.19 62.47 63.16 63.16 .7332 .7462 .7462 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets.  
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
N.A.= not applicable. 
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The methodology we use in this thesis is similar to the methodology of Hill 
(1979). In her model Hill uses OLS techniques and controls for numerous individual 
characteristics in successive regressions. She reports that as she includes more controls in 
her model, the marriage premium stays stable. She controls for variables such as job 
tenure, firm specific training, occupation, industry, and work experience which are 
controlled automatically in our officer data set. She finds that married men earn 25-30 
percent more than single men. 
For URL male officers, the promotion probability difference between married and 
single officers is similar to the promotion probability difference between married and 
single workers in the firm studied by Korenman and Neumark (1991). In our probit 
model the promotion probability for URL officers is 8.7 percentage points higher than for 
single officers, whereas in the KN study the promotion advantage for married workers is 
10.5 percentage points. 
The model results (coefficients and marginal effects) for STF males are shown in 
Table VI.2. Similar to URL male officers, STF male officers receive positive and 
significant marriage premiums for all three performance indicators. However, the 
marriage premiums for STF/RL males tend to be smaller than those observed for URL 
males. The results show that STF officers who entered the Navy married received 15.5 
percent more RAP’s during grades 1 and 2 than officers who were single at entry. 
Officers who were married at the beginning of grade 3 received 4.2 percent more RAP’s 
than officers who started grade 3 as single. At the promotion review, officers who were 
married, were promoted at a 6.0 percent higher rate than officers who were single. 
Similar to the results for URL males, college grade point average (GPA) and 
graduate school education (GRADSCH) are significantly and positively correlated with 
the performance variables. However, the effect of prior enlisted experience (PRIOR) in 
the STF male models is not significant. Ethnicity is negatively correlated with the 
performance variables in the models. 
Table VI.3 shows the performance model results for URL females. For URL 
females, a marriage premium is observed only for the PCTRAP12 performance variable. 
It shows that URL female officers who were married at entry received 15.4 percent more 
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RAP’s during grades 1 and 2 than female officers who were single at entry. Neither 
PCTRAP3 nor promotion were significantly affected by marital status. 
 
Table VI.2. Performance Models for STF/RL Malesa. 
 
Variable PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 




(1.429) -- -- -- -- -- -- 




(1.114) -- -- -- 










RL -- -- 9.417*** (1.322) -- -- 
1.791 
(1.141) -- -- 
.198*** 
(.062) 









































































































































Intercept 24.410 1.598 -.761 55.744 49.148 48.667 1.210 .715 .616 
N 4,270 3,663 3,663 4,209 3,629 3,629 2,700 2,561 2,561 
R2 .0282 .0469 .0599 .0281 .0490 .0497 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
-2 LOG L N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 3,172.22 2,959.29 2,949.08 
Dep. Mean 38.45 37.84 37.84 68.53 68.88 68.88 .7133 .7130 .7130 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets. 
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
N.A.= not applicable. 
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Table VI.3. Performance Models for URL Femalesa. 
 
Variable PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 




(2.678) -- -- -- -- -- -- 




(2.211) -- -- -- 










SWO -- -- 7.428** (3.163) -- -- 
4.000 
(2.734) -- -- 
.892*** 
(.198) 
PILOT -- -- -8.706** (4.127) -- -- 
-2.612 
(3.604) -- -- 
.317 
(.233) 
NFO -- -- -19.66***(5.258) -- -- 
-.054 
(4.561) -- -- 
.798** 
(.310) 









































































































































Intercept 12.178 -11.518 -10.408 47.035 33.539 33.510 1.322 .857 .760 
N 2,342 1,997 1,997 2,326 1,991 1,991 1,483 1,425 1,425 
R2 .0219 .0282 .0405 .0243 .0789 .0802 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
-2 LOG L N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1,613.51 1,501.29 1,468.97 
Dep. Mean 36.80 35.19 35.19 66.65 66.46 66.46 .7599 .7614 .7614 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets. 
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 




2. Accumulated Years of Marriage 
The results of estimating the effects of years of marriage on performance for URL 
males are shown in Table VI.4. The results show that the more years URL males have 
been married, the more RAP’s they receive and the more likely they are to be promoted. 
URL males who have been married approximately 2 years receive 8.9 percent more 
RAP’s than single officers during grades 1 and 2, while those who have been married 
approximately 4 years receive 28.8 percent more RAP’s than single officers. RAP’s 
received during grade 3 are also higher for officers who have been married longer. URL 
males who have been married for 3 years receive 4.6 percent more RAP’s in grade 3, 
while officers married for 6 years receive 5.4 percent more. The promotion outcome 
variable shows similar results. Officers who have been married approximately 3 years are 
promoted at a 7.7 percent higher rate than officers who have been single. The promotion 
probability for married officers increases as the years of marriage increases. Officers who 
have been married for 6 years were 8.6 percent more likely to be promoted, and officers 
with 10 years of marriage were 10.8 percent more likely to be promoted.  
For URL male officers, the results support the view that marriage makes URL 
male officers more productive. Korenman and Neumark (1991) find that the marriage 
earnings premium continues to grow with each year of marriage and they cite this finding 
as evidence that marriage increases productivity. They claim that if the higher wages of 
married men were due to the selection of men with higher wages in a marriage, then the 
higher wages of married men would not increase systematically as the years they have 
been married increase. 
For STF/RL male officers, the results in Table VI.5 for RAP’s during grades 1 
and 2 are not affected by years of marriage. However, RAP’s received during grade 3 are 
negatively correlated with accumulated marriage years. Officers who have been married 
3 years received 7.9 percent more grade 3 RAP’s, while officers who have been married 
for 6 years received only 5.5 percent more RAP’s than single officers. The promotion 





Table VI.4. Marriage Premium Based on Accumulated Years of Marriage for URL 
Malesa. 
 
PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 
SM_ (2 years) 2.686*** (.655) _SM (3 years) 
3.390*** 




MM_ (4 years) 8.721*** (.780) _MM (6 years) 
3.954*** 







































-- -- GRADSCH 3.697*** (.641) GRADSCH 
.245*** 
(.033) 



































Intercept 46.727 Intercept 64.815 Intercept 1.989 
N 19,627 N 11,372 N 11,522 
R2 .0710 R2 .0469 -2 LOG L 12,432.12 
Dep. Mean 30.18 Dep. Mean 73.09 Dep. Mean .7472 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets. 
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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Table VI.5. Marriage Premium Based on Accumulated Years of Marriage for STF/RL 
Malesa. 
 
PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 
SM_ (2 years) -.361 (1.557) _SM (3 years) 
6.099*** 




MM_ (4 years) 6.451*** (1.609) _MM (6 years) 
4.265*** 
























-- -- GRADSCH 2.555** (1.169) GRADSCH 
.335*** 
(.066) 



































Intercept .005 Intercept 55.39 Intercept .586 
N 3,664 N 2,510 N 2,524 
R2 .0613 R2 .0394 -2 LOG L 2,903.65 
Dep. Mean 37.85 Dep. Mean 76.99 Dep. Mean .7132 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets. 
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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The results for URL females are shown in Table VI.6.The marriage premium 
results based on accumulated marriage years are not significant for URL females.  
Table VI.6. Marriage Premium Based on Accumulated Years of Marriage for URL 
Femalesa. 
 
PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 
SM_ (2 years) -2.623 (3.121) _SM (3 years) 
5.231** 




MM_ (4 years) 4.815 (4.113) _MM (6 years) 
-.842 


































-- -- GRADSCH 8.985*** (1.571) GRADSCH 
.451*** 
(.087) 



































Intercept -10.441 Intercept 40.461 Intercept 1.145 
N 1,997 N 1,406 N 1,346 
R2 .0398 R2 .0638 -2 LOG L 1,385.68 
Dep. Mean 35.19 Dep. Mean 72.25 Dep. Mean .7585 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets. 
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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3. Selection into Marriage 
The results of the models constructed to test for selection are shown in Table VI.7. 
URL male officers who were single during grades 1 and 2 and will be married during 
grade 3 received 12.7 percent more RAP’s during grades 1 and 2 than officers who were 
single during grades 1 and 2 and remained single during grade 3. STF/RL officers who 
were single during grades 1 and 2 and will be married during grade 3 received 17.1 
percent more RAP’s during grades 1 and 2 than officers who were single during grades 1 
and 2 and remain single during grade 3. The results for URL female officers are not 
significant.  
The results imply that officers who are single, but who become married later, 
perform better than those who are single and who do not marry later. These results 
suggest that at least some portion of the higher RAP’s that is received by married officers 
and a portion of the higher promotion probability of married officers are due to some 
unobservable characteristics of officers who choose to marry, and the apparent higher 
performance of married officers is not due entirely to increased productivity by marriage. 
Rather, the performance difference is in some part due to selection of potentially more 
successful officers into marriage. 
Cornwell and Rupert (1996) use this same methodology in their study. They show 
that single men who will marry in the future earn more than single men who do not marry 
in the future. Cornwell and Rupert claim that the entire marriage premium is due to 
selection bias rather than due to productivity differences because they find that workers 
who are single and will be married in the future earn at least as much as those who are 
already married. According to our findings, we cannot attribute all the higher 
performance of married officers to the selection bias argument. Even if single officers 
who will marry in the future (SSM) receive more RAP’s than single officers who will not 
marry in the future (SSS), they do not receive as many RAP’s as officers who are already 
married (MMM). 
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Table VI.7. Analysis of the Effect of Eventual Marriage on Current Performance 
(PCTRAP12)a. 
 
VARIABLE URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female 




















RL -- 7.627*** (1.577) -- 
GURL -21.519*** (4.186) -- -- 
SUB .463 (1.214) -- -- 
SWO -- -- 8.489** (3.657) 
PILOT -21.589*** (.976) -- 
-3.859 
(5.647) 
NFO -18.240*** (1.044) -- 
-17.851*** 
(6.241) 








































Intercept 45.255 -10.092 -.457 
N 11,254 2,472 1,328 
R2 .0793 .0637 .0389 
Dep. Mean 33.65 41.45 35.78 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, and the standard error in parentheses. Dependent 
variable for this table is PCTRAP12. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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To correct for the potential selection bias in the marriage premium, a fixed-effects 
model also is estimated. In the model, the change in supervisor evaluations from one time 
point to another are estimated as a function of the variables that are changing for 
individuals from one time point to another. The variables such as commissioning 
background, ethnicity, prior enlisted service and college grade point are not included in 
the model since they do not change over time. To control for community changes only 
the officers who do not change their communities are included in the samples for the 
fixed-effects models. The formulation of the models is similar to the formulation of 
Korenman and Neumark (1991): 
(PCTRAP3i-PCTRAP12i)= =α(Xit - XiT) + γ (MSTit - MSTiT) + νit 
where the dependent variable captures the difference in RAP’s accumulated during 
grades 1 – 3. Xit represents the variables during grade 1-2 that changed during grade3, 
and XiT is the same variables during grade 3 for officer i. MST represents the change in 
marital status during these two periods. Marital status change is coded in three different 
variables. One variable represents no change in marital status over time (STS_MTM: 
single to single or married to married), which is omitted from the equation as a base; 
another (STM) represents the change from single at entry to married at grade 4; and the 
other variable (DW) represents the change from married to divorced during this period. 
The results are shown in Table VI.8. 
The results show that officers who were single at entry and then married during 
grades 1 – 3 received higher RAP’s compared to officers whose marital status did not 
change over time. The RAP’s received during grade 3 by URL males who were single at 
entry and got married is 9.42 percent higher than the RAP’s received by officers who 
remained either single or married for ten year period. These RAP changes are 10.88 and 
25.82 percent higher for STF/RL male and URL female officers, respectively.   
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Table VI.8. Fixed-effects model (Dependent variable = ‘PCTRAP3-PCTRAP12’)a. 
 
Variable URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female 




















N 9,343 2,521 1,140 
R2 .0078 .0086 .0062 
Dep. Mean 41.40 35.39 36.61 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, and the standard error in parentheses.  
bThose whose marital status changes from single to married between entry and O3. 
cThose whose marital status changes from married to single between entry and O3 
dChange in number of dependents between entry and O3 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
 
4. Number of Dependents 
Table VI.9 shows the results of estimating the effect of dependents on 
performance for URL males. URL males who have more dependents receive higher 
RAP’s during the entire ten-year period. While married officers with a spouse only 
receive 22.9 percent more PCTRAP12 than the single officers, this difference increases 
for each additional dependent reaching 41.2 percent higher for married officers who have 
three or more dependents. PCTRAP3 is 4.8 percent higher for married officers who have 
only a spouse as a dependent, but the difference reaches 15.2 percent higher for married 
officers who have a spouse and three or more dependents. The results for promotion 
outcome are not consistent depending on the number of dependents.  
Tables VI.10 and VI.11 show the results for STF/RL males and URL females, 
respectively. The results for STF/RL males also show that officers with more dependents 
receive more RAP’s. Married officers with only a spouse receive 21.2 percent more 
PCTRAP12 than single officers, and married officers with three or more children receive 
27.5 percent more PCTRAP12 than the single officers. Married officers with one child 
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receive 8.6 percent more PCTRAP3 and married officers with three or more children 
receive 12.0 percent more PCTRAP3. The results for PROMO are not significant. For 
URL females the results reveal no differences between single and married. 
If we compare URL males with STF/RL males, STF/RL male officers’ 
performance difference based on the number of dependents is smaller. One explanation is 
that since STF/RL officers do not deploy as often as URL officers (URL officers also 
travel overseas more), STF/RL officers may devote more time to their dependents and 
devote less time to work. Anderson and Krieg (2000) claim that more dependents may 
cause married workers to spend more time doing household work and to specialize less in 
market work. Our results do not justify this claim completely since as the number of 
dependents increase performance also increases. The only justification may be that more 
dependents require allocating more time for household work. Rather, our results justify 
the Hill’s (1979) claim that more dependents mean more responsibility for a married man, 
which causes them to work harder and perform better. 
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Table VI.9. The Effect of Number of Dependents on Performance for URL Malesa. 
 
PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 





















































GRADSCH -- GRADSCH 12.598*** (.699) GRADSCH 
.246*** 
(.033) 



































Intercept 48.726 Intercept 62.352 Intercept 1.893 
N 19,446 N 19,583 N 11,640 
R2 .0699 R2 .0605 -2 LOG L 12,575.02 
Dep. Mean 30.18 Dep. Mean 63.16 Dep. Mean .7462 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets.  
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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Table VI.10. The Effect of Number of Dependents on Performance for STF/RL Malesa. 
 
PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 
























-- -- DIVCH1 3.850 (4.239) DIVCH2 










-- -- GRADSCH 10.559*** (1.327) GRADSCH 
.337*** 
(.065) 



































Intercept 2.618 Intercept 51.709 Intercept .570 
N 3,602 N 3,629 N 2,561 
R2 .0621 R2 .0517 -2 LOG L 2,947.31 




Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets.  
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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Table VI.11. The Effect of Number of Dependents on Performance for URL Femalesa. 
 
PCTRAP12 PCTRAP3 PROMOb 














































-- -- GRADSCH 14.873*** (1.625) GRADSCH 
.462*** 
(.084) 



































Intercept -4.570 Intercept 35.591 Intercept .745 
N 1,847 N 1,991 N 1,425 
R2 .0398 R2 .0846 -2 LOG L 1,467.53 
Dep. Mean 35.03 Dep. Mean 66.46 Dep. Mean .7614 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets.  
 bPROMO model includes dummies for fiscal years 87 – 95 as explanatory variables, but to 
conserve space these are not presented. 
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*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
5. Human Capital Investment 
In an organization, investment in human capital can be measured with three 
different variables: firm-specific training, tenure and formal education. Since the first two 
variables are the same in our officer groups, we analyze the relationship between 
graduate education and marital status. In the Navy, graduate education is a mix of firm-
specific and general training.  
The goal is to determine whether marriage may provide an incentive for married 
employees to invest more in formal education. The results of the graduate education 
model are displayed in Table VI.12. It shows that for URL males and STF/RL males, 
married officers are more likely to invest in graduate school education (by approximately 
4 – 11 percentage points) than single males.  For URL females no differences was 
observed between single and married officers. 
 
Table VI.12. The Effect of Marriage on Graduate School Educationa. 
 









































GURL -.448*** (.142) -- -- 
SUB -.555*** (.042) -- -- 
SWO -- -- .051 (.130) 
PILOT -.750*** (.038) -- 
-.600*** 
(.225 





Table VI.12. The Effect of Marriage Years on Graduate School Educationa (cont). 
 
Variable URL Male STF/RL Male URL Female 
RL -- .011 (.059) -- 








































Intercept -1.606 -2.341 -2.142 
N 11,590 2,539 1,352 
-2 LOG L 11,847.44 2,792.53 1,717.39 
Dep. Mean .2370 .2950 .3572 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, and the standard error in parentheses. Dependent 
variable for this table is GRADSCH. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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B. NONRANDOM SAMPLE SELECTION DUE TO RETENTION 
Simple t-tests showed that retention differs between single and married for both 
URL and STF/RL males (see Table V.24). This difference might cause biased estimates 
if leavers systematically differ from stayers and the unobserved characteristics that 
explain this difference are correlated with performance. This section accounts for 
nonrandom sample selection in retention for the PCTRAP3 and PROMO models for URL 
and STF/RL males. In particular, a Heckman-style two-step model is used to estimate the 
PCTRAP3 model. Since both retention and promotion are binary, a bivariate probit is 
used to estimate the PROMO model (Greene, 2000).  
For both proxies, in the first stage of the two-step models the determinants of 
retention are estimated. The retention model includes not only marital status but also 
commissioning background, ethnicity, age and GPA. It also includes instrumental 
variables to identify the retention model. The instruments include officer’s community 
(GURL, SUB, PILOT, SUB, NFO), which should reflect differences in civilian 
marketability, and staled preferences for a Navy-funded graduate education program. The 
preferences variable (PREFER) signals long-term career intentions in the Navy because 
graduate school attendees incur an additional service obligation. Finally, prior enlisted 
service (PRIOR) is included as an instrument. These instrumental variables are omitted in 
the PROMO model (the second stage), since the system is identified when at least one 
variable in the selection equation is omitted from the structural model (Bowman and 
Mehay, 2001). Results of the retention models are presented in Table VI.13.  
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Table VI.13. Probit Retention (to O4) Modelsa. 
 
Variable URL Male STF/RL Male 
MARRIED1 .108*** (.018) 
.220*** 
(.043) 
USNA .375*** (.025) 
.012 
(.074) 
ROTC .278*** (.025) 
-.021 
(.064) 
NESEP .978*** (.072) 
.319*** 
(.077) 
GURL -.805*** (.067) -- 
SUB -.051 (.027) -- 
PILOT .203*** (.023) -- 
NFO .567*** (.028) -- 
RL -- .332*** (.047) 
AFAM .073 (.048) 
-.046 
(.119) 
OTHERS -.032 (.059) 
-.175 
(.137) 
AGE .034*** (.006) 
.040*** 
(.011) 
PRIOR .385*** (.040) 
.561*** 
(.073) 
GPA -.016 (.010) 
-.006 
(.024) 
PREFER .372*** (.023) 
.324*** 
(.042) 
Intercept -1.143*** (.142) 
-.139*** 
(.275) 
N 22,101 4,072 
-2 Log L 28,573.62 4,908.98 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, and the standard error in parentheses. Dependent 
variable for this table is STAY. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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The results of the selection corrected models (PCTRAP3 and PROMO) are 
presented in Table VI.14. The positive coefficient of lambda (λ) in the PCTRAP3 model 
indicates that unobservables associated with retention decisions are correlated with higher 
RAP scores during the six years in grade 3 (PCTRAP3). The coefficient of lambda is 
positive for both URL and STF/RL males, but significant only for URL males. In other 
words, some unobservable characteristics of URL males that explain retention are 
significantly and positively correlated with PCTRAP3. RAP scores of URL and STF/RL 
males are 5.5 and 4.2 percent, respectively higher than for single officers in the OLS 
estimates in columns 1 and 3. However, after controlling for self-selection married URL 
males, receive only a 3.2 percent higher premium in RAP scores in column 2. Among 
STF/RL males no significant self-selection is observed between the stay-leave decisions 
and RAP scores as the lambda term is insignificant in column 4. However, the effect of 
marital status is no longer significant. 
In the promotion model, the negative error covariance (Rho) indicates that, 
holding all variables constant, those who left before the promotion point had a higher 
predicted promotion probability. The error covariance term is significant for STF/RL 
males, but not for URL males. Among URL males both the simple probit model and the 
selection corrected model find approximately 9 percentage points higher promotion 
probabilities for married officers. Married STF/RL males have approximately 5.3 
percentage points higher promotion probability than single males in the simple probit, but 
after controlling for retention the promotion premium falls to 4.4 percentage points. 
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Table VI.14. Effects of Marital Status in Selection-Corrected Modelsa. 
 
PCTRAP3 PROMO 
URL male STF/RL male URL male STF/RL male Variable 













(1.229) -- -- -- -- 













Lambda (λ) -- 12.687*** (1.697) -- 
1.095 
(4.453) -- -- -- -- 
Rho (ρ) -- -- -- -- -- -.074 (.077) -- 
-.506** 
(.042) 
N 19,583 11,324 3,629 2,498 11,640 22,101 2.561 4,072 
Dep. Mean 63.16 73.21 68.88 77.11 -- -- -- -- 
Notes:  aEach cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and partial effect in 
brackets. Both models include GPA, GRADSCH, PRIOR, USNA, ROTC, NESEP, AFAM, 
OTHERS, and AGE (dummies for fiscal years 87 - 95 in PROMO) as explanatory variables but to 
conserve space these are not presented in table. 
*Indicates significance at .10 level; **at .05; ***at .01 level. 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
A. SUMMARY 
Simple statistical tests show that married male officers receive higher supervisor 
evaluations and are promoted at higher rates than single male officers. The results also 
show that there is a positive relationship between supervisor evaluation scores and 
promotion outcomes. Also, officers who receive higher RAP’s are promoted at higher 
rates than those who receive fewer RAP’s. 
The analysis of the effects of marital status using OLS regression models shows 
that married officers generally have better performance than single officers. Male 
unrestricted line officers who were married when they entered the Navy received 24 
percent more RAP’s on grades 1 and 2 fitness reports than officers who were single at 
entry. During grade 3, officers who were married at the beginning of grade 3 received 6 
percent more RAP’s than officers who entered grade 3 as single. At the O4 promotion 
point, officers who were married were promoted at a 9 percent higher rate than officers 
who were single. 
Male staff officers who were married when they entered the Navy received 16 
percent more RAP’s during grades 1 and 2 than officers who were single at entry. During 
grade 3, officers who were married at the beginning of grade 3 received 4 percent more 
RAP’s than officers who started grade 3 as single. At the grade 4 promotion review, 
officers who were married were promoted at a 6 percent higher rate than single officers. 
For URL females, officers who were married at entry received 15 percent more RAP’s 
during grades 1 and 2. The effect of marriage on PCTRAP3 and PROMO are not 
significant for URL female officers. 
The analysis of the effects of the years of marriage shows that the more years 
URL male officers have been married, the more RAP’s they receive and the higher their 
promotion rates. Increasing performance with increasing years married provides evidence 
that marriage increases the productivity of URL males. For STF/RL males, the results are 
not the same. STF/RL male officers receive more RAP’s when they have fewer years of 
marriage. Based on these results, it is difficult to claim that marriage does not increase 
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the productivity of STF/RL male officers. Even if the performance measures do not 
increase with the years married, married officers still receive higher scores than single 
officers. One explanation may be that since staff officers spend more time at home than 
line officers, many of whom are deployed overseas, staff officers devote more time to 
household production. The results of the models analyzing the relationship between the 
number of dependents and performance support this explanation.  
For both URL and STF/RL males, performance indicators increase with the 
number of dependents. Having more dependents increases the performance of URL males 
more than that of STF/RL males. The positive effect of dependents on productivity due to 
increased responsibility may be lower for STF/RL officers due to time demands of 
household duties. While married URL officers with a spouse (but no children) receive 
22.9 percent more PCTRAP12’s than single URL officers, this difference increases for 
each additional dependent, reaching a difference of 41.2 percent for married officers who 
have three or more dependents. For STF/RL males these differences are 21.25 percent 
and 27.52 percent, respectively. 
The analysis of selection into marriage shows that, for both URL and STF/RL 
males, single officers who will marry in the future receive more RAP’s than single 
officers who will remain single in the future. URL male officers who were single during 
grades 1 and 2 and will be married during grade 3 received 12.7 percent more RAP’s 
during grades 1 and 2 than officers who were single during grades 1 and 2 and remained 
single during grade 3. STF/RL males who were single during grades 1 and 2 and will be 
married during grade 3 received 17.1 percent more RAP’s during grades 1 and 2 than 
officers who were single during grades 1 and 2 and remained single during grade 3. 
These results show that at least some portion of the higher performance of married 
officers that are attributed to marriage is not due to increased productivity, but is due to 
potentially more successful officers choosing to marry. 
Fixed effects models are estimated to calculate the effects of marriage on 
productivity corrected of selection bias. The results show that officers who were single at 
entry and then married during grade 4 received higher RAP’s when they were married 
than when they were single. The RAP’s received during grade 3 by URL male officers 
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who were single at entry and got married before O4 is 9.42 percent higher than the 
change in RAP’s between grade 3 and grade 1-2 for officers who remained either single 
or married for the entire ten year period. This RAP change for STF/RL male officers is 
10.88 percent. These results are evidence that even after controlling unobservable 
individual characteristics the positive effect of marriage on the performance of officers 
can still be observed. 
Differences in human capital investments may be one reason that productivity 
differs between married and single officers. To test for such differences we analyzed the 
determinants of graduate degrees. The results of OLS models of the determinants of 
graduate degrees show that married officers make higher investments in human capital. 
Since firm-specific training and tenure are the same for all Naval officers, graduate 
education is the only human capital investment that officers can make. The results show 
that URL and STF/RL males who are married have attained more graduate education 
than single officers. 
Married officers stay in the Navy in higher proportions (See Table V.24). In the 
estimation of the effects of marriage on productivity, to correct for probable biases that 
would arise because of this higher retention of married male officers, a Heckman style 
two-step model was estimated. The results of this model show that the PCTRAP3 
premium for married URL males falls by about half in the retention-corrected models 
from 6 percent to 3 percent. The PROMO variable results remained constant after 
adjusting for retention differences and found no significant selection bias.  
Overall results suggest that married male officers receive 4-24 percent higher 
evaluations from their supervisors and also promote at a 4-8 percent higher rate than 
single officers. Anderson and Krieg (2000) obtained the same positive relationship 
between marriage and supervisors’ evaluation scores and promotion outcomes in U.S. 
Marine Corps data. They found that married Marines without dependents are 4.7 percent 
higher than unmarried Marines in promotion probability to E-4 while married Marines 
without dependents receive .15 points higher scores (scale is from 0 to 5) than single 
Marines in E-2’s performance evaluation. Korenman and Neumark (1991) also obtained 
similar results using a company-level data set. They found that male workers who are 
95 
married in the company receive higher performance ratings from their supervisors and are 
promote 10.5 percent higher than single workers. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Married males achieve higher performance than single officers. The results of all 
models show that the higher performance of married males is mostly due to increased 
productivity associated with marriage. The higher performance for married officers falls 
somewhat in the two-step models that adjust for selection and thus suggests a small 
selection bias. At least some portion of the apparent success of married officers is due to 
the choice of higher ‘qualified’ officers to marry and unobservable factors correlated with 
both marriage and performance. However, after controlling for these unobservable 
individual-specific higher ‘qualifications’ in fixed-effects models, the performance 
premium for married males was still positive. 
C. POLICY ISSUES 
The results show that marriage both increases retention and also the productivity 
of male officers in the Navy. In the Navy, Quality of Life (QOL) policies supporting 
family life help to increase retention and the productivity of male officers who are 
married. The main QOL programs that supporting families in the military are the 
following: Child Care Program, Exceptional Family Member Program, Family Advocacy 
Program, Family Member Employment Program, Marriage Enrichment Program and 
Youth and Teen Program. Thus, these programs that support families thus have an 
indirect effect on retention and officer performance. 
Another important finding of the study is that the positive effect of marriage is 
higher for male unrestricted line officers. This is contrary to the expectation that because 
URL officers have more overseas duties, deploy more frequently, and are subject to 
extensive family separation they would be less productive. Because of the argument that 
marriage increases the responsibility of married officers, this higher responsibility may 
cause married males to work harder. Staff officers do not deploy as much and may have 
to allocate more time to household production. Hence, they may allocate more time to 
their families than URL officers. However, it must also be considered that URL male 
officers marry in lower proportion than STF/RL male officers, especially in the early 
96 
career periods. The expectation of long family separation may cause them to delay 
marriage decisions. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The analysis of the marriage premium here is primarily based on a single binary 
variable for marriage. The ‘single’ group consists of both never married officers and 
officers who are divorced or widowed. It would be useful to divide marital status into 
single, married, divorced and widowed. 
The ‘accumulated years of marriage’ variable is calculated by taking the average 
at three time points. The exact date of marriage is not available in the Navy data. 
Calculating the accumulated marriage years more precisely would be better when 
analyzing the effects of accumulated years of marriage. 
The data set does not include information about the spouses of the officers. This 
limitation prevents an analysis of the specialization hypothesis. In the literature review 
the specialization argument is tested by estimating the effect of the spouse’s labor force 
status on the husband’s earnings. When testing the specialization argument, as Hersh and 
Stratton (2000) did in their study, calculating the actual hours spent in household 
production by a married officer is a good approach. As a further step, the hours spent in 
household production by a single officer also should be calculated. 
The employer favoritism hypothesis could not be tested directly in this study. 
Researchers test this argument by comparing the productivity of self-employed married 
men and self-employed single men. The data set used in this study does not allow for 
making such a distinction. To be able to test if employer favoritism exists in supervisor 
evaluation scores, it would be necessary to identify the supervisors who evaluated each 
officer and test whether there is bias in their evaluation based on the correlation between 
the marital status of the rater and the rated person. 
Finally, the effects of marriage on an officer’s life are calculated for only early 
and mid career period. Spouses play a larger role in the officer’s late career life. There is 
no data about the officer’s late career life in this study. When analyzing the effects of 
dependents on productivity, it would be better to consider the ages of the children as well 
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